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 ABSTRACT 
 
Many of Africa’s coastal areas are experiencing alarming levels of degradation. In 
response, marine conservation efforts there are on the rise, many of which claim 
community empowerment as an essential goal. Researchers have begun to use theories of 
political ecology to study the ways in which conservation practices in Africa can 
negatively affect communities living near protected areas. However, much of this 
important research is focused on land-based ecosystems and has overlooked coastal 
regions. This thesis begins to fill that gap by using a political ecology-based approach to 
understand the complex historical, political, and environmental factors that affect issues 
of degradation and conservation in the Menai Bay Conservation Area of Zanzibar, 
Tanzania. This study combines fieldwork and a literature review to conclude that while 
the conservation area recognizes the importance of authentic community empowerment, 
it has yet to achieve that goal, thereby compromising the overall success of the project. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A. Thesis overview 
The health of coastal ecosystems around the globe is in decline. Even as fishers use more 
expensive gear and dedicate increased time to fishing, catches are steadily decreasing 
worldwide (Glaesel 2000: 321). Africa’s coastal areas are no exception to these trends. 
As a result, marine conservation efforts on the continent have been on the rise during the 
past three decades, many of which claim community-based resource management as a 
primary goal. At the same time, researchers have begun to study the ways in which 
conservation practices in Africa often negatively affect communities living in and around 
protected areas. Among these researchers are geographers— and more specifically 
political ecologists— who strive to combine analyses of cultural ecology and political 
economy to fully understand the causes of environmental degradation and effects of 
conservation. However, much of this important research has been focused on land-based 
ecosystems and has overlooked efforts in coastal regions of Africa. This thesis attempts 
to begin to fill that gap by using a political ecology-based research approach to 
understand the complex historical, political, and environmental issues that affect 
conservation efforts in one small marine park, the Menai Bay Conservation Area 
(MBCA) of Zanzibar, Tanzania.  
 Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous polity of Tanzania, is a part of the East Africa 
Marine Eco-region, which stretches for 7,000 km and includes some or all of the 
territorial waters of Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and part of South Africa 
(Kulindwa 2005: 2). The degradation of this eco-region— in the form of deforestation of 
mangroves, loss of coral reefs, declining fish stocks, and soil and beach erosion— has 
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vast implications for the estimated 22 million people who live near its shores, most of 
whom depend on the marine environment for their sustenance and livelihood (Kulindwa, 
et al. 2005: 3). Tanzania’s coastline stretches for 2,300 kilometers, accounts for 
approximately 15 percent of the country’s total land area, and supports nearly a quarter of 
its population (Torell, et al. 2004: 341). It is one of the poorest nations in the world, with 
an annual per capita income of $420 US dollars (Department of State 2008); furthermore, 
the standard of living in rural coastal areas like those found in Zanzibar is generally lower 
than in the rest of the nation. In these areas, people depend on natural resources— in the 
form of agriculture, fishing, and seaweed cultivation— for both subsistence and 
commercial purposes (Lindén and Lundin 1996). 
 Effective coastal conservation and resource management is thus of the utmost 
importance in Zanzibar, both for the health of its fragile ecosystems and for the already 
poor communities who depend upon them for their livelihoods. Concepts of conservation 
and natural resource management are not new to the coastal communities. Rather, long-
standing practices exist in Zanzibar, as people have depended on the health of their 
resources since they first settled there, no later than the 5th century AD. However, 
traditional forms of management eroded during the colonial and post-colonial eras, as 
those in power assumed much of the authority that traditionally rested with local 
community elders. This shift in power has rendered traditional conservation methods less 
effective over time, and in some cases they have become non-existent.  
 In recent decades, Zanzibar has seen a sharp decline in the health of it’s marine 
environment and has in turn become a site of large-scale conservation projects backed by 
international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and multi-lateral aid agencies. 
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Inherent to many of the coastal conservation initiatives in the region is a language about 
the importance, and even necessity of community empowerment. While this rhetoric 
sounds good in theory, the success of translating such endeavors into reality has been 
minimal. Rather these projects, while often well intentioned, have served to further shift 
control over conservation and management practices into the hands of government 
agencies and western organizations, thereby failing to truly empower local communities 
to manage their own resources. As this thesis will show with the case study of Menai Bay 
Conservation Area, these failures are often because “the social context has been analyzed 
insufficiently…” (Blaikie 1987: 53). The implications of such failures can be enormous, 
both for the ecosystems in need of protection and the people living in them.  
 This thesis argues that while western-based organizations and national 
governments have an important role to play in coastal conservation efforts in Africa, they 
must do a better job of recognizing and incorporating local forms of environmental 
knowledge and practices into their models of conservation. By taking a political ecology 
approach to the study of Africa’s coastal ecosystems, I believe that researchers can begin 
to paint a more comprehensive picture of complex local contexts and to bridge the gap 
between local communities and those with the financial resources needed to implement 
large-scale conservation projects. In so doing, I believe political ecologists can play a 
critical role in helping to create conservation projects that are supported by large-scale 
stakeholders, but which are defined and driven by local communities.  
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Figure 1.1 Zanzibar 
 
(Zanzibar Department of Environment 2004: 4) 
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B. Chapter outline 
Chapter 2 introduces the primary theoretical basis of the thesis, political ecology. It 
provides a brief history of the origins of political ecology and argues for its importance in 
studying issues of environmental degradation and conservation in Africa. Chapter 2 also 
provides some case studies of political ecology research, focusing on work done in both 
mainland Africa and Zanzibar. Finally, the chapter explores some common questions 
asked and concepts employed by political ecologists, as well as how the theories— 
primarily used to understand land-based ecosystems— can be expanded to include 
coastal environments.  
 Chapter 3 provides background on the history of western-driven conservation 
efforts in Tanzania, in an effort to paint a clearer picture of how the current state of 
conservation came to be. It begins with a look at the exclusionary practices of the 
colonial era and the ways in which colonialists forced Africans off of their own lands in 
order to create the Eden-type landscapes they imagined to exist on the continent. It then 
looks at the post-colonial period, during which many Africans hoped they would regain 
control over the resources that had traditionally been theirs, only to continue to be 
marginalized by the newly formed Tanzanian government and the western conservation 
organizations that helped develop the nation’s new environmental policies. Chapter 3 
then delves into the “new” era in conservation of the 1980s and 1990s, during which a 
new rhetoric of community empowerment was developed and many conservation 
organizations attempted to reframe local communities as “noble ecological savages.” The 
chapter also discusses the general failure of this new era and the return to marginalizing 
practices, even though the rhetoric of community empowerment often remains.  
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 Chapter 4 introduces the primary practices of coastal management used 
throughout the world, namely those of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and 
the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). It then details five case studies of 
coastal conservation projects from around the global south to provide a realistic picture of 
the difficulty of implementing effective ICZM policies in a range of complicated 
contexts. These case studies help to show that while Zanzibar is a unique case, it fits 
neatly into and has much to add to the broader discussion of how to create effective 
coastal conservation efforts that are truly community-based. 
 Chapter 5 provides a brief background on Zanzibar, with a focus on the historical 
and political backgrounds that continue to play a role in conservation efforts there. The 
chapter also details the history of traditional methods of conservation and resource 
management used along the coast, establishing these practices as long-standing systems 
that were eroded during the colonial and post-colonial periods. The chapter also 
establishes the fact that Zanzibaris have a deep understanding of their environment, even 
though those in power sometimes paint them as ignorant of such things. 
 Chapter 6 provides a detailed introduction to the thesis’s case study, Menai Bay 
Conservation Area (MBCA). It goes on to detail the primary conservation initiative in the 
protected area, the World Bank-backed $75 million Marine and Coastal Environmental 
Management Project (MACEMP). The chapter presents the overall objectives and goals 
of MACEMP, as stated by project documents. This sets the stage for chapter 7, in which I 
draw from six weeks of interview-based fieldwork conducted in Zanzibar during July and 
August of 2009 to take a critical view of MACEMP. The first section of Chapter 7 
discusses Zanzibari’s feelings toward MACEMP, both positive and negative. The chapter 
7 
also takes a serious look at the project literature— specifically at its language of 
community empowerment— to discern whether or not the project has been effective in 
meeting that goal. Using both my own fieldwork findings and the work of other 
researchers, I conclude that levels of community empowerment in the project are 
superficial at best, thus showing that MBCA is another example of top-down 
conservation shrouded in a language of community empowerment. 
 Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by coming back to the political ecology literature 
presented in Chapter 2 and directly applying it to the case of Menai Bay. In so doing, it 
presents the political ecology of MBCA to the extent possible as a result of this fairly 
brief research project. It then goes on to outline a longer research trajectory one could 
take in order to do a more in depth political ecology-based study of MBCA, including 
some ideas on methodology for doing so. Finally, Chapter 8 argues for the importance of 
studying issues of coastal degradation and conservation from a political ecology 
perspective, in Africa and across the world.  
 This thesis does not strive to bring new or under-studied topics to light. Indeed, 
environmental issues in Africa, the degradation of coastal ecosystems, and the ways in 
which conservation can marginalize the people who live near protected areas are all 
thoroughly studied subjects. Rather, my goal is to begin to bridge the gap between these 
topics, and to make clear the benefits of approaching coastal issues from a political 
ecology standpoint. I believe that in so doing, we can take one small step toward creating 
coastal conservation practices in Africa that are environmentally sound and socially just.  
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 Chapter 2: Political Ecology 
A. Background and introduction  
This thesis is grounded in the theories of political ecology. They frame the research 
questions I ask about and the approach I take to issues of coastal conservation in 
Zanzibar. The political ecology literature is vast, and it would be impossible to 
incorporate all of it here. Rather, I have pulled from the work of political ecologists that 
best informs my own research— particularly those who study environmental issues in 
Africa. The first section of this chapter provides a brief discussion of the definition of 
political ecology, the origins of the field, and why it is an important tool to use in 
understanding environmental issues. The second section examines some case studies of 
political ecology research, with a focus on that conducted in Africa, to better understand 
how political ecologists frame and answer their questions. The third section examines the 
work of scholars who have done research specifically in costal Tanzania, including that 
which is not explicitly political ecology but which answers questions that are important to 
a political ecology-based understanding of Zanzibar. Finally, in the last section I explore 
some potential methodology for doing political ecology work. I also discuss how the 
theory, traditionally applied to land-based ecosystems, can help us to better understand 
issues of environmental degradation and conservation in coastal settings. 
 The origins of political ecology can be traced to the 1970s, when it arose in 
response to the need for a theoretically based understanding of land degradation and other 
environmental problems within a “local-global political economy” (Peet et. al 1996: 4). 
At this time, the term itself was just beginning to be used by some scholars; others were 
not yet using the term, but were establishing a foundation of related work on which future 
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political ecologists would stand— most notably of these perhaps is David Harvey. In 
1974 Harvey stated, “Arguments concerning environmental degradation, population 
growth, resource scarcities, and the like can arise for quite disparate reasons and have 
quite diverse impacts. It is therefore crucial to establish the political and social origins 
and impacts of such arguments” (Harvey 1974: 275). The concepts of political ecology 
built on the work of Harvey and other scholars as it continued to gain momentum 
throughout the 1970s. By the 1980s, it had flourished into its own field (Bryant 1997: 8). 
 Political ecology is a broad term and can be defined in a number of ways. Some 
place more emphasis on political economy, while others focus more on the role of 
political institutions (Robbins 2004: 8). However, they all suggest an alternative to an 
“apolitical” ecology approach (ibid.). Blaikie and Brookfield, the scholars who are often 
attributed with fully developing the concept in the 1980s, describe political ecology as an 
approach that “combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political 
economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society 
and land–based resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself” 
(Blaikie et al. 1987: 17). The concept put forth by Blaikie and Brookfield focused on the 
role of the “land manager” within a given economic system (Blaikie et al. 1987: 3). 
Muldavin further defines political ecology as an approach that is “a historically informed 
attempt to understand the role of the state, the social relations within which land users are 
entwined, and resulting environmental changes” (Muldavin 1996: 237). Finally, in an 
attempt to synthesize a myriad of common definitions, Robbins offers that political 
ecology is based on “empirical, research-based explorations to explain linkages in the 
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condition and change of social/environmental systems, with explicit considerations of 
relations of power” (Robbins 2004: 12).  
 Why is political ecology important? What makes it a more valuable tool for 
understanding environmental issues than other theories? Bryant argues that contemporary 
environmental work wrongly assumes “that human-environmental interactions can be 
understood in terms of selected social concerns…alone, without the need to grasp the 
nettle of political and economic interests and conflicts that are typically associated with 
those concerns” (Bryant 1997: 6). A political ecology approach helps us to begin to 
untangle those complex issues. In addition, Robbins (2004: 12) asserts that political 
ecology is an important tool because it can serve as a critique of views of the 
environment that tend to be “favored by corporate, state, and international authorities.” 
He goes on to argue that political ecology shows the negative aspects of environmental 
policies, “especially from the point of view of local people, marginal groups, and 
vulnerable populations” (ibid).  
 Peet et al. further make clear the importance of viewing environmental 
degradation and conservation efforts through a lens of political ecology, arguing that 
environmental movements are often not simply about conservation; they can serve as a 
stage for broader social action and as a source of opposition to those in power. They say:  
In world systems which destroy broad, even global environments, 
[environmental movements] have the potential to become widespread social 
movements- many environmental movements cut across class, gender, and 
regional divisions. They can also be fundamental movements in that they 
challenge the very basis of society- how people use nature, how human 
nature comes about, how imaginations are imagined. At stake in 
environmental movements is nothing less than the way people understand 
their humanity (Peet et al. 1996:268). 
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Thus, political ecology is an important tool for approaching issues of environmental 
conservation and degradation, particularly in the post-colonial context where issues of 
power and access to resources tend to be complicated and long-standing issues. The 
following case studies look at how political ecologists approach the study of 
environmental issues, with an emphasis on work conducted in Africa. They provide 
examples of some of the types of questions and problems political ecology is well suited 
to address, as well as some of the potential dangers of using political ecology uncritically.  
B. Case studies of political ecology 
In their comparison of agro-forestry schemes in Gambia and Java, Schroeder et al. (1996) 
emphasize the importance of carefully considering the dynamics within local 
communities. They challenge what they see as the prevailing belief of NGOs and large 
aid organizations— that agroforestry schemes work to improve both the environment and 
local livelihoods. To do so, they closely examine the power dynamics inherent within 
local communities involved in such schemes. They conclude that agroforestry projects 
have failed to truly recognize community dynamics and have thereby aggravated already 
existing gender and class conflicts; in so doing, they have also undermined environmental 
efforts. They conclude, “from a political ecological point of view, agroforestry systems 
are strongest when people can manage their resources independently” (Schroeder et al. 
1996: 202). While their work addresses two specific case studies of agroforestry projects, 
the lessons learned can be applied more broadly, including to coastal ecosystems in 
Zanzibar. This research serves as an important reminder that we must not only consider 
the dynamics between various stakeholder groups, but also those that exist within and 
among the local communities affected by conservation schemes.  
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 Along similar lines, Moore’s work (1996) on the role of what he calls “micro-
politics” is also important to political ecology research. He argues that there is too much 
emphasis on capitalism and political economy within political ecological conversations. 
He posits that while those things should be considered, more attention should be given to 
“(1) the micro-politics of peasant struggles over access to productive resources; and (2) 
the symbolic contestations that constitute those struggles” (Moore 1996: 126). He argues 
that by giving more attention to the micro-politics, we will be able to “unravel how 
competing claims to resources are articulated through cultural idioms in the charged 
contests of local politics” (ibid.). As an example, he looks at a study of environmental 
resource conflicts in Zimbabwe. He uses the “dynamic interplay of culture, power, and 
history” to show how struggles over resources are also struggles over cultural meaning 
(Moore 1996: 127). He argues that peasants see their landscapes as a symbol of power 
and of historical struggles for land and argues that we need to “situate resource struggle 
within the cultural production of landscape and resources” (ibid.: 139). As in Zimbabwe, 
Zanzibar has a turbulent colonial and post-colonial history and it will be important to 
consider how this frames current cultural meanings of access to and management of 
marine resources. 
 Lucy Jarosz (1996) provides a particularly useful case study in which she uses 
political ecology to highlight the ways in which those in positions of power often 
inaccurately frame local communities as the destroyers of their own environments. To do 
so, she uses the case study of deforestation in colonial-era Madagascar. The French 
colonialists in Madagascar claimed that the Malagasy people’s traditional method of 
shifting cultivation, or tavy, was leading to severe levels of deforestation because it 
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involved the burning of forests to clear agricultural land (Jarosz 1996: 156). The practice, 
deemed “irrational,” was subsequently banned and much of the agricultural land was 
transitioned into the more “rational” practice of growing cash crops for export— mainly 
coffee. This, the French thought, would lead to both conservation and increased revenue.  
 However, as a result of the increase in coffee farming, deforestation actually 
continued to increase, as did food insecurity for local people (Jarosz 1996: 154). Not only 
was the most fertile land transitioned to growing coffee instead of subsistence crops, but 
because coffee-farming practices in the region left large expanses of soil without plant 
cover, it became vulnerable to heavy rains and subsequently to erosion and deforestation 
(ibid.). It is also important to note that the French were not only interested in 
conservation and cash crops; banning tavy also allowed them more control over local 
populations. Whereas tavy necessitated people to live spread out over large expanses of 
land, the French could now more easily consolidate the population into villages, whereby 
there were more easily controlled and taxed (Jarosz 1996: 156). 
 However, the Malagasy did not respond well to the tavy ban; instead of viewing it 
as a chance for forest conservation or to garner higher income, they saw it a form of 
“labor control” and the cause of destruction of sacred ancestral spaces (Jarosz 1996: 158). 
In response, there were mass revolts and large-scale acts of resistance to the ban, often in 
the face of fines and imprisonment (ibid.). This resistance was significant, as it “…meant 
more than pitting the right to subsistence over forest conservation; it embraced issues of 
power, labor control, culture, and Malagasy identity” (Jarosz 1996: 158). In the end, the 
French were never able to eradicate the practice. This case study is relevant for two 
reasons. First, it shows how those in power can frame (often falsely) local populations as 
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the cause of degradation, particularly when their resource use practices do not appear 
“rational.” Second, it uses political ecology to show “how local forms of resistance to the 
dominating discourses of reason also involve struggles over the meanings of nature, 
culture, and landscape” (Jarosz 1996: 161).  
 While Brown et al. (2004) do not focus their research in Africa, they nonetheless 
provide an important discussion on how to approach issues of scale in political ecology 
research throughout the global south. They argue that while it is easy for researchers to 
favor the local stakeholders within the political ecology approach to studies of 
conservation and development, it is important not to favor them uncritically— or, to fall 
into what they call the “scalar trap” (Brown et. al 2004: 608). They argue that usually 
“the scalar trap takes the form of a “local trap” that leads researchers to assume that the 
key to environmental sustainability, social justice, and democracy… is devolution of 
power to local-scale actors and organizations” (ibid).  
 Brown et al. argue that a particular scale does not have any inherent qualities, 
rather it is produced and reproduced through political strategies and struggles and by 
different actors over time (Brown et al. 2004: 609). Instead of recognizing this, however, 
political ecologists tend to assign certain characteristics to certain scales, falling into the 
“scalar trap.” Whereas the local scale tends to become equivocated with culture and 
ecology, the “wider scales” then become synonymous with “political economic 
processes” (Brown et al. 2004: 612). The authors argue that understanding the reality of 
scalar politics is “central to understanding human-environment relationships in 
development processes” (ibid.: 614). This work can help us to better understand the roles 
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and impacts of multiple stakeholders who work on multiple scales, without assuming that 
local communities are the ones who are always doing things in the “right” way.  
 Finally, Willems-Braun (1997) provides a vital discussion on the importance of 
recognizing the way colonial histories frame contemporary notions and understandings of 
nature. He argues that “residual traces” of colonialism take the form of “buried 
epistemologies… in everyday relations and in social, economic, and political institutions” 
(Willems-Braun 1997: 5). He goes on to argue that contemporary notions of nature are 
likewise buried epistemologies that are “often constituted within, and informed by, the 
legacies of colonialism” (ibid.). This, he argues, is true for industrial forces and 
environmentalists alike, as their views of nature are “inherited from colonial logic and 
practice, with its method of classifying, recording, and describing the world” (Robbins 
2004: 125).  
 Willems-Braun urges us to “decolonize” inherited notions that nature is separate 
from culture, rather, it is “embedded in social histories” and intimately intertwined with 
cultural identities. He argues that contemporary struggles for nature— as defined by the 
west— are “already complicit in a politics of nature that risks reenacting colonial 
relations…” (Willems-Braun 1997: 6, author’s emphasis). This serves as a cautionary 
message to political ecologists, that they approach notions of nature critically, 
particularly those that are void of long and complex histories of human-environment 
relationships. The consequence of failing to do this, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
can be the creation of a new form of colonialism buried under the guise of conservation.  
 Taken together, these case studies and discussions paint a picture of the types of 
work that political ecologists do, and the important questions researchers who use the 
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theories ask and attempt to answer. The first three case studies paint a picture of what 
political ecology research looks like in Africa. The final two provide important reminders 
that political ecology is not perfect, and that those who employ it must be mindful of not 
approaching issues of the environment and conservation uncritically. With those lessons 
in mind, political ecology can serve as an important tool for understanding the historical, 
cultural, and political settings in which conservation projects occur. At it’s best, political 
ecology can help uncover the ways in which those projects can be become both 
ecologically successful and socially appropriate for specific local contexts.  
C. Political ecology research in Zanzibar 
While there is not a lot of work being done in Zanzibar that is specifically called 
“political ecology,” there are some researchers working in the region that are answering 
questions and using approaches commonly employed by political ecologists. Three 
notable examples are discussed in brief here, and their work is also cited extensively 
throughout the thesis.  
 The first, Garth Myers, is the only one of the three who is doing explicit political 
ecology-based research in Zanzibar. While he doesn’t focus specifically on coastal 
resources, his concrete political ecology approach helps us to understand the political 
situation that frames general environmental issues in Zanzibar, thereby highlighting 
important relationships and dynamics that are critical to the success (or lack thereof) of 
conservation projects. He takes as his case study Zanzibar’s first national park, the 
Jozani-Chwaka Bay Conservation Area (JCBCA). As will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6, Myers outlines the strong divide between Zanzibar’s two political parties in 
the village of Chwaka. He asserts that conservation efforts in JCBCA are stymied by 
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strong political divisions, as well as by the many livelihood struggles residents face as a 
result of poverty (Myers 2002: 154). Because the community is so politically divided, it 
can make residents resistant to government enacted conservation schemes (ibid.: 156). 
Likewise, political divides can make it difficult for residents to come together to oversee 
authentic community-based conservation initiatives. The political divide found in 
Chwaka is not unique to that Zanzibari community. Rather, by showing how the 
relationships between local communities and the government can affect conservation 
efforts, Myers sets the social and political stage for this thesis’ main case study, Menai 
Bay Conservation Area, located directly due south of JCBCA. 
 Arielle Levine’s work is also extremely important to the study of Menai Bay. 
While she does not call herself a political ecologist, her work provides an essential 
backdrop for this thesis and could certainly be classified as political ecology. Levine 
assesses the roles of and relationships between different stakeholders in conservation 
projects in Zanzibar, and the affects these roles and relationships can have on the relative 
success of a project. In particular, she explores the role of the Zanzibari state in relation 
to local communities and international organizations involved in coastal conservation 
schemes. Increasingly, these donors have become interested in implementing community-
based projects. However, the state government has ensured that they remain the official 
intermediaries between local communities and outside organizations. In doing so, they 
often undermine the independence of local communities in the “locally-based projects” 
and thus undermine the ultimate goal of the conservation schemes themselves (Levine 
2007: 565). Furthermore, in line with the approaches of Moore and Schroeder discussed 
above, Levine finds differing feelings toward conservation efforts within and among 
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different villages, due to the unequal allocation of resources and power (Levine 2006: 
123). Her discussion of the political dynamics in conservation schemes in Zanzibar 
provides an important political and historical understanding that I rely on heavily 
throughout the thesis and which can certainly be considered political ecology.  
 Finally, the work of anthropologist Christine Walley is also extremely relevant to 
this thesis. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, she conducted an extensive study 
of the Mafia Island Marine Park (MIMP), located off the coast of Southern Tanzania. 
While also not explicitly political ecology, the study highlights the dynamics between 
government, NGOs, and local communities, as well as how the resulting “social drama” 
has hindered conservation efforts in the park (Walley 2004). While the islands of Mafia 
are associated politically with the mainland, they have significant similarities to Zanzibar. 
Therefore, much overlap can be drawn between conservation and development efforts 
between the two places. Her work combines with that of Myers and Levine to paint a 
broad picture of the politics and power dynamics within conservation efforts in coastal 
Tanzania. Together they provide an understanding of the social and political nuances that 
help to ground the thesis in a political ecology framework that is also regionally relevant.  
D. Applying political ecology to coastal ecosystems 
Throughout the political ecology literature there is a lack of emphasis on coastal 
ecosystems. Perhaps this is because Blaikie and Brookfield focused so much on the role 
of the land manager. Perhaps it is because during the time the field was first developed, 
coastal issues had not yet come to the forefront of environmentalists’ agendas. Perhaps it 
is because it is simply more difficult to address issues of resource access, ownership, and 
control in ecosystems that are more fluid and dynamic than their land-based counterparts. 
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Whatever the reason for the dearth of marine-based political ecology work, I argue that it 
is an important gap to fill. As discussed in the introduction, coastal ecosystems around 
the world are experiencing severe levels of degradation. Political ecology is a potential 
tool that can be used to help create effective conservation initiatives that are ecologically, 
politically, and culturally informed. 
 While there is no formula for how to “do” political ecology in any ecosystem, the 
work discussed in the preceding sections provides ideas about how to structure such 
research. Furthermore, Bryant (1997) puts forth three concrete questions that political 
ecologists should be asking in their research and analysis: (1) What are the various ways 
and forms in which one actor seeks to exert control over the environment of other actors? 
(2) How do power relations manifest themselves in terms of the physical environment? 
And, (3) why are weaker actors able to resist their more powerful counterparts (Bryant 
1997: 11)? Additionally, in their seminal book, Land Degradation and Society (1987), 
Blaikie and Brookfield lay out some core concepts that still define political ecology 
today; these include “a cross-scale chain of explanation, a commitment to exploring 
marginalized communities, and the perspective of a broadly defined political economy” 
(Robbins 2004: 72, author’s emphasis). Finally, as seen in Figure 2.1, Blaikie (1995) uses 
a political ecology framework to identify each stakeholder group involved in a 
conservation project, including their positions and sources of power, goals, and means to 
reach those goals. While this example comes from a national park in Zambia, it can easily 
be modified to work for other conservation projects. This and the other concepts can be 
applied to issues of both land- and marine-based environmental degradation. We will 
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return to them later in the thesis, modifying them for Menai Bay Conservation Area. 
Together, they begin to answer the question of how to “do” political ecology work.  
 
Figure 2.1 Interest Groups in Lwangwa National Park, Zambia 
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(Blaikie 1995: 208) 
 
 
 The goal of the thesis is to begin to understand how to view coastal issues through 
a political ecology lens, using the Menai Bay Conservation Area as a case study. The 
above questions and concepts put forth by Bryant and Blaikie and Brookfield provide a 
starting point for framing the research approach. Using both the land-based research done 
by political ecologists, as well as the research done directly in coastal Tanzania— 
including that of Myers and those researchers who may not identify as political 
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ecologists, but whose research can help us answer the questions of political ecology— I 
will begin to apply the theory directly to issues of coastal degradation. Utilizing this 
approach will help me to look critically at the people-environment relationships of Menai 
Bay Conservation Area, illuminating the complex roles played by local communities, 
international organizations, and the Government of Zanzibar. In doing so, the goal is to 
determine the relative success of conservation efforts in Menai Bay— particularly in 
terms of community empowerment— as well as how these efforts might be improved to 
better meet MBCA’s goals of fostering both ecological and socio-economic stability.  
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Chapter 3: A History of Conservation in Tanzania 
A. Top-down conservation  
In order to better understand the current status and potential success of coastal 
conservation in Tanzania, this chapter explores the history of land-based conservation 
efforts in the country. Mainland Tanzania, as with much of East Africa, has long been 
considered an important “hotspot” of biodiversity, replete with savannahs full of endemic 
wildlife. The total protected lands of sub-Saharan Africa now account for over half of all 
protected lands in the tropics, with twenty-five percent of Tanzania alone set aside in 
conservation areas (Schroeder 1999: 364). While these figures are impressive, the 
conservation of these landscapes has had long-term and often detrimental affects on the 
populations living there. This is partly because conservation has long been used as a 
tactic by Westerners to subjugate Africans. The history of conservation in Tanzania, as 
with much of the rest of the African continent, is heavily intertwined with its colonial 
history and legacy. The “…impulse to conserve, protect or otherwise ‘manage’ natural 
resources has historically been central to efforts by ‘external’ powers … to exert social, 
political and economic control over African polities” (Schroeder 1999: 360). While the 
powers in charge of protecting these lands have changed over time, the top-down 
strategies have remained largely the same; they continue to utilize the unequal power 
dynamics established during colonialism to enforce conservation.  
B. Colonial-era conservation 
Conservation is not a new phenomenon in the region; indeed, it has ancient roots in many 
parts of the continent (Mkumbukwa 2008: 590). However, colonialism brought new 
forms of environmental protection and management; most often this entailed the colonial 
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government setting aside large tracts of land for wildlife, with limited access to natural 
resources granted to the Africans residing there.  
 Colonial era environmental protection in Africa stemmed from the relationship 
Europeans had with their environments at home. During the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries people in England and Europe viewed nature as something separate from 
humans, something to be either tamed or exploited in the name of capitalism (Walley 
2004: 172). It is also important to note that Europeans at this time imagined Tanzania to 
be a pristine and empty wilderness, full of wildlife, and without human influence. This 
view was in part influenced by a string of disasters that occurred in the late nineteenth 
century in the vast region of what would become Serengeti National Park; a series of 
droughts, diseases, and increased raiding by the Maasai tribe forced inhabitants to flee, 
thereby creating an even deeper sense of a vast and uninhabited land (Shetler 2007: 139). 
However, the notion colonialists had of an empty and untamed land “was largely 
mythical and could only become a reality by relocating thousands of Africans whose 
agency had in fact shaped the landscape for millennia” (Neumann 1995b: 151). Thus, 
local populations were often excluded from the protected areas in Tanzania and 
throughout much of colonial Africa. This marginalization came outright through forceful 
evictions and the creation of strict new laws, and through other more subtle measures, 
such as increased hunting restrictions and the requirement of unaffordable hunting 
licenses. For instance, colonial game laws restricted all forms of indigenous hunting 
techniques, making guns (only owned by the very wealthy) the sole legal hunting method 
(Shetler 2007: 181). 
 
24 
Figure 3.1 Tanzania in Africa 
 
 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2010) 
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 Another example of this marginalization comes from Neumann’s (1992) study of 
the Mt. Meru region of Northern Tanzania1. Mt. Meru is one of the few areas in the 
country that actually attracted European settlement; this settlement had consequences on 
the land use patterns of the region that can still be seen today. Beginning as early as the 
1890s, Europeans began to take over large tracts of land in the area for coffee plantations. 
In doing so, they also took control over the best water sources in the region, excluding the 
Tanzanians from this vital resource. In 1928, the British established the Meru Forest 
Reserve, thereby “protecting” the entire mountain and further limiting land rights. Thus, 
not only did the Meru people lose the best land to European settlement, their access to the 
remaining marginal lands was severely limited by the new reserve. Over time, this area 
would become part of Arusha National Park and usage rights would diminish further. The 
process of exclusion continued after decolonization, culminating in the 1970s with the 
outlawing of beekeeping, the final traditional practice that had been allowed within park 
boundaries. As was common in Tanzania, exclusion to land rights in the Mt. Meru region 
was a lengthy process. “Rather than being eliminated wholesale, customary rights in the 
mountain’s forests [were] chipped away in a piecemeal fashion, as the state gradually 
tightened its restrictions on resource access” (Neumann 1992: 96). 
 As seen from this case study, the establishment of national parks intensified the 
exclusion of Tanzanians from natural resources found in protected areas. During the 
1930s, the colonial government came under increasing pressure from external groups like 
the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire to transition African reserves 
to National Park status. The first official park, Serengeti, was established in 1948. 
                                                
1 Case study sourced from (Neumann 1992: 85-97) 
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National park policies utilized slow processes of exclusion, particularly of the Maasai 
peoples. At first, they were literally classified as “fauna” by the trustees of the park, a 
classification that allowed them to continue residing there for the first years after the 
parks inception (Walley 2004: 173).  In order for them to remain, however, they had to 
continue to live in their “traditional” ways, those traditions being defined by the 
colonialists, not the Maasai. The government essentially invented or eliminated Maasai 
traditions to fit their own perceptions of the African “Eden” they imagined (Neumann 
1995b: 160; Shetler 2007). 
 Over time, officials became more concerned with scientific issues of the park and 
saw human agency as an increasing threat to wildlife numbers and the “unspoiled” 
wilderness. Practices of mass eviction and denial of customary rights intensified, creating 
conflicts and tensions that continue until today (Walley 2004: 174). In 1959, the Maasai 
were fully evicted from the parklands; they were denied access to their traditional hunting 
grounds and sacred areas. When local residents of the park regions continued to hunt for 
food, graze their animals, and gather firewood for fuel within park bounds, their activities 
were deemed illegal and they were labeled as “poachers” by the colonial government 
(Mkumbukwa 2008: 591). Thus, these Tanzanians were faced with a difficult choice 
between acting illegally to maintain their customs and livelihoods (with the potential of 
harsh repercussions), or keeping to the poorest agricultural and grazing lands to eke out a 
living. Through these exclusionary and marginalizing processes, the colonial government 
kept Africans from creating any kind of economic competition and at the same time 
ensured wildlife was available for their own hunting and export purposes (Schroeder 
1999: 363). Thus, the landscape that the colonialists considered to be “…‘natural’ was in 
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fact a tool for reshaping human society for the economic benefit of the colony” (Shetler 
2007: 185). When decolonization became a reality in the early 1960s, Tanzanians hoped 
they would once again be granted access to the lands that had been theirs before the 
period of colonization.  
C. Post-colonial policies 
As in many parts of newly independent Africa, Tanzania’s government retained many of 
the structures and policies implemented by the British; conservation projects were no 
exception (Mkumbukwa 2008: 593). However, because the colonial government had 
allowed few Africans into the upper management positions of natural resource 
management and wildlife programs, the new government was particularly ill equipped to 
take over the administration of these projects (Neumann 1995a: 365). Many large 
Western conservation organizations were concerned about this issue, and they kept a 
close eye on the country as decolonization loomed near. When the post-colonial 
government came to power, these organizations were at the ready to step in and offer 
guidance, and the government welcomed their help (Neumann 1995a: 365).  
 In early 1961, three months before Tanzanian independence, incoming president 
Julius Nyerere gave an important speech on his conservation goals, known as the Arusha 
Manifesto (Neumann 1995a: 365). Often left out of this part of the story is the fact that a 
majority of the speech was written by employees of the large conservation organization 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), a telling sign of who would soon be steering the 
government’s conservation programs. During one part of the speech, Nyerere strayed 
from the WWF script and made a famous comment, one that clearly indicated what his 
own intentions were for conservation. He said:  
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I personally am not very interested in animals. I do not want to spend my 
holidays watching crocodiles. Nevertheless, I am entirely in favor of their 
survival. I believe that after diamonds and sisal, wild animals will provide 
Tanganyika with its greatest source of income. Thousands of Americans and 
Europeans have the strange urge to see these animals. (Walley 2004: 174) 
 
 
 Nyerere’s speech, and this statement in particular, made one thing utterly clear: 
the primary purpose of conservation in Tanzania after decolonization was not to conserve 
the environment for ordinary Africans who had long made their livelihoods on those 
lands. Rather, it was to conserve them for wealthy tourists with a “strange urge” to see 
Tanzania’s impressive wildlife, and who would in turn bring a great deal of money into 
the Tanzanian economy (Mkumbukwa 2008: 594). The new government was desperate to 
create a strong independent state, and thus their focus was on garnering foreign exchange 
and implementing effective development strategies. As a result, conservation efforts were 
aimed mostly at the tourism sector (ibid.). Thus, instead of returning land to local 
populations, the government continued colonial policies that increased marginalization of 
indigenous peoples and decreased their access to important resources. However, the 
government did not act alone in the implementation of these policies; indeed, they 
depended substantially on many of the large Western conservation organizations who 
offered their guidance and leadership.  
 Two such organizations were the WWF and the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN, now the World Conservation 
Union). In fact, Nyerere’s Arusha Manifesto was the official launch of IUCN’s new 
African Special Project, whose mission was to support post independence environmental 
management throughout Africa (Neumann 1995a: 366). The Project trained Africans to 
effectively implement and maintain environmental policies. These new conservation 
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bureaucrats were primarily trained in Western ideologies of environmental protection, 
insuring that conservation in Africa would look much as the West thought it should. The 
Project also created a new elite class of wildlife and natural resource managers; these new 
bureaucrats used many of the same top-down approaches as their colonial predecessors, 
including the forceful evictions of local residents from parklands. This intensified 
conflicts and tensions between park officials and local residents (Neumann 1995a: 366).  
 The increasing exclusion of indigenous communities from their lands during the 
1960s and 1970s resulted in further enmity from local people, and an increased lack of 
willingness to work with conservation efforts. More and more people began to violate 
park rules. While some of these “poachers” were hunting for illegal products such as 
ivory to sell on the international black market, most simply hunted or grazed animals on 
land that had previously belonged to them (Walley 2004: 175). As a result of these 
increased violations, conservationists and environmental management professionals 
realized that their exclusionary processes had actually served to create a threat to 
protected environments. Throughout the global south, conservationists began to realize 
that indigenous communities needed to become stewards of the protected lands in order 
for conservation to be successful. Thus, a new era in conservation, one that claimed to 
recognize the rights of indigenous populations, began in Tanzania and across the globe.  
D. The “new” era of conservation  
Beginning in the 1980s, many institutions, including the Tanzanian government, large aid 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and 
international NGOs, began to implement projects that promoted more community 
involvement in Natural Resource Management (NRM). The new theory believed that 
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conservation efforts would only be successful if indigenous populations benefited 
(economically and/or socially) enough from projects to warrant a change in their 
environmentally “destructive” behaviors (Neumann 1997: 577). National governments 
throughout East Africa, with the support of large conservation organizations, attempted to 
implement new community-oriented conservation projects that generated revenue for 
local people. However, many of these projects were unsuccessful, as they failed to truly 
involve and consider local needs and desires.  
 Norton-Griffiths (2007) offers a case study of this type of situation from 
Tanzania’s northern neighbor, Kenya.2 Many tourists visit Kenya and Tanzania each year 
to view the great wildebeest migration, thus giving the governments great incentive to 
keep animal numbers high. The wildebeest population is threatened, in part, by the 
agricultural and grazing practices of pastoralists in the border areas of Kenya’s national 
parks. Thus, the government began to work with pastoralists in an effort to boost 
wildebeest numbers. They created incentives for them to lease their lands to tour 
operators, instead of using the land for agriculture or grazing. However, pastoralists soon 
realized that they actually made more money from traditional uses then they did from 
leasing their land. Furthermore, they realized that their grazing lands were endangered by 
the wildebeest migration, further diminishing their potential return from grazing and 
agriculture. Norton-Griffiths contends that because the wildlife provided no real 
economic opportunity for pastoralists, they had no incentive to help conserve wildebeest 
populations. He asserts that the weak state of wildlife conservation in Africa is a result of 
poorly thought out state conservation models such as this one, coupled with 
                                                
2 Case study sourced from (Norton-Griffiths 2007: 41-64) 
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“international conservation organizations which, with their seemingly limitless resources, 
lack of accountability and hidden agendas, wield such power and influence over 
conservation policy” (Norton-Griffiths 2007: 59). He argues that they are often top-down 
organizations with more of an interest in raising money in Western countries than 
creating truly successful projects in Africa, thus failing to take into account the on-the-
ground realities of their proposed conservation schemes.  
 Thus, as this example shows, while this “new” conservation agenda has been 
shrouded in rhetoric of the importance of local involvement, success has been limited. 
While on the surface it looks as though indigenous traditions and needs are being 
considered, in depth analysis shows otherwise. “Post-colonial Tanzania has failed to 
promote a wildlife conservation practice that is ethnographically and ecologically 
sensitive” (Mkumbukwa 2008: 598). As a result, Tanzania has seen a continuation of 
conservation practices that look remarkably similar to those instituted under the colonial 
system. As Walley (2004: 188) says, “the era of European colonialism created many of 
the bureaucratic pathways, networks, and structures through which contemporary power 
relationships continue to unfold, albeit with different players.” In the last decade, many 
have begun to criticize the motives behind these top-down environmental protection 
tactics. Taking an in-depth look at some of these criticisms can help shed light on why 
there has been such limited success in this “new” era of environmental protection. 
E. Conservationists as colonialists  
Many disturbing facts about international conservation organizations have been exposed 
in recent years, leading to heated discussions in many parts of the world about the 
appropriateness of their work. It must be noted here that many people engaged in 
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conservation work should be praised for their willingness to take on the difficult and 
complex task of environmental protection in the developing world; indeed, much of the 
work done by these organizations is extremely important and respectable. They are 
responsible for the protection of many endangered ecosystems around the globe. And yet, 
certain aspects of their work undoubtedly warrant critique, particularly in terms of their 
relationships with indigenous communities. In fact, reevaluation of large-scale 
environmental work is vital if we hope to create better-planned and executed 
conservation projects.  
 Many scholars and activists have critiqued conservation efforts, particularly those 
undertaken by large-scale NGOs in the global south. In 2004, anthropologist Mac Chapin 
offered a scathing critique of international conservation efforts in his article “A Challenge 
to Conservationists.” In the article, he refers primarily to “The Big Three” environmental 
NGOs; they are the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Conservation International (CI), and 
The Nature Conservancy (TNC). While Chapin is referring mainly to these three 
organizations, his argument can easily be extended to large-scale conservation initiatives 
in general. He critiques two main aspects of their work: their “disturbing neglect of the 
indigenous peoples whose land they are in business to protect” and their conflict of 
interest with large donors (Chapin 2004: 1).  
 One of the most disturbing parts of “A Challenge to Conservationists” is Chapin’s 
discussion of the shift in priorities for environmental work during the past decade. 
Whereas previous rhetoric so heavily focused on the need to work with local 
communities, it now appears to prioritize large-scale conservation strategies over locally 
based projects. Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, many conservation organizations 
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issued statements of testimony to the importance of including local communities in 
conservation projects (Chapin 2004: 5). However, even as they touted the importance of 
community participation, actual on-the-ground execution of projects often showed 
minimal input from indigenous populations. This stemmed, in part, from the complex 
challenge of merging the differing values and interests of Western conservationists with 
those of the local populations with whom they work. Whereas indigenous groups are 
often most concerned with legalizing their own land rights and gaining some sort of 
access to resources, conservation organizations may not see humans as part of the 
protection scheme best for the land they are working on (Chapin 2004: 7).  
 Another challenge results from conservationists’ expectations that community-
based projects will be successful within a relatively short period of time (Barrow et al. 
2001: 36). Barrow et al. argue that community conservation initiatives are “often locked 
into time frames too short for the organizational evolution required.” Conservation 
organizations, seeking immediate results, tend to put more money into the projects, under 
the “fallacy that money can substitute for time” (ibid.). This can increase dependency and 
weaken self-sufficiency in local communities, inevitably leading to the conclusion that 
the project has failed. Indeed, Hulme et al. argue that a longer time frame is necessary if 
these projects are to be successful, particularly in the African context. They argue, “…the 
task of creating a conservation policy that is embedded in African society, rather than 
imposed from above, will be the work of generations” (Hulme et. al 2001:7). 
 Due in part to these issues, many of the community-based conservation projects 
implemented in the global south during the 1980s and 1990s failed. As a result, some 
conservation organizations began to navigate away from their prior commitment to 
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community participation and empowerment. Some of the major organizations have now 
shifted their focus toward projects based on Western science and large-scale conservation 
strategies, and away from those that consider the importance of small-scale realties 
(Chapin 2004: 3).  
 Another major shift has occurred in the sources of funding for large-scale 
conservation organizations. In the past few decades, as conservation projects have grown 
and outreach to different parts of the globe has expanded, NGOs have had to build 
increasingly larger budgets. In 2002, one estimate put the combined budgets of WWF, 
TNC, and CI for work in the global south at more than half of the roughly $1.5 billion 
available for all conservation efforts across the globe. Additionally, the budgets of these 
three organizations for work in the developing world increased from approximately $240 
million in 1998 to nearly $490 million in 2002 (Chapin 2004: 8). 
 While increased funding for conservation seems like a positive thing on the 
surface, the origins of the money offer an alarming realization. Whereas most funding 
previously came from individual donations and private foundations, a large percentage of 
conservation budgets now come from bilateral and multilateral agencies, as well as 
private corporations (Chapin 2004: 8). At first, many NGOs eased into relationships with 
large-scale donors, careful of potentially controversial relationships. For instance, WWF 
began taking money from USAID in the late 1970s, but were careful to make sure the 
money never funded more than 50 percent of any given project. However, this has 
become difficult as more large corporations, often with poor environmental records of 
their own, have begun to donate large sums of money to these organizations (Chapin 
2004: 11). It is important to note that this funding is funneled almost exclusively through 
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the conservation organizations, not indigenous populations, reinforcing the West’s power 
to create project agendas. 
 This growth in money has come with serious complications. First, there is now 
increased competition among the organizations as they vie for the same funding sources, 
and a resulting lack of willingness to work with one another. Another complication is due 
to the fact that some funding for the organizations is coming from oil, timber, 
pharmaceutical, and other large extractive industries and thus makes it difficult for NGOs 
to oppose their destructive practices, as these companies are often working on the very 
lands the conservation organizations are being supported to protect. Even if funders do 
not have links to controversial industries, NGOs still need to be careful to appeal to donor 
values in order to successfully procure funding. In this effort to appeal to the ideals of the 
sought after donors, organizations can loose sight of their original goals, often at the 
expense of already existing projects (Sachedina 2008: 345).  
 These critiques concur with the concerns already discussed about the “new” era of 
conservation in Tanzania. They make it strikingly clear that it is not just government 
officials enacting top-down conservation approaches that further marginalize their own 
people; NGOs themselves are often supporting and driving these efforts. As Sachedina 
points out, rather than serving to empower local communities, conservation organizations 
are sometimes involved in policies that can serve to further “impoverish and 
disempower” Africans. He argues that like development organizations, conservation 
organizations have the ability to “distribute fortune and misfortune” (Sachedina 2008: 
396). It is thus easy to see how governments, industry, and environmental organizations 
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themselves have institutionalized a form of conservation that looks alarmingly similar to 
the colonialism of an older era.  
 Particularly in Africa, where conservation has its roots so firmly in colonial 
values and policies, we can see that while the rhetoric has evolved over time, on-the-
ground actions have not usually followed suit. This form of conservation has been 
dubbed “ecocolonialism.” When compared side by side, one can easily argue that there 
are indeed many comparisons to be made between colonialism and conservation in the 
developing world. (1) Both are/were instated and controlled by Western powers. (2) The 
agenda of each reflects Western values. (3) Local communities’ needs, desires, and 
traditions are/were often not taken into account by those in power. (4) Both sometimes 
utilize brutal policies against local communities, such as forced removal from traditional 
lands. And, (5) conservation in the global south, just as colonialism before it, is justified 
as the West doing good on behalf of underdeveloped nations, even though it exists in 
large part for the benefit of Western audiences. Timothy Luke sums up the ecocolonial 
tactics employed by the WWF in Africa well when he says: 
In many ways, the WWF is one of the world’s most systematic practitioners of 
ecocolonialism… WWF wildlife protection programs have been concocted by 
small committees composed mostly of white, Western experts, using insights 
culled from analyses conducted by white, Western scientists that were paid for by 
affluent, white Western suburbanites. At the end of the day, many Africans… are 
not entirely pleased by such ecological solicitude (Luke 1997: 38). 
 
 Scholars and activists alike must give serious consideration to the comparison of 
conservationist with colonialist. If it is ignored, the risk is a continued tradition of top-
down conservation that marginalizes and disempowers local communities. Instead, we 
must attempt to find a way forward that merges Western and indigenous values and 
works to benefit valuable ecosystems and the people living in them.  
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F. Implications for coastal conservation and management 
Coastal conservation projects are in a unique position to change the conservation 
trajectory, as they only date back, at the earliest, to the 1940s; and they didn’t begin to 
occur on a large scale until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Levine (2006: 49) asserts: 
Because these marine protected area programs were predominately initiated 
during the same period that international agencies and protected area 
managers were acknowledging the importance of community-based methods 
of conservation, marine programs in Tanzania to not have the same history 
of exclusion and conflict as land-based conservation programs. 
 
This lack of a long history, and correlating negative connotations, provides a distinct 
opportunity for the implementation of conservation projects that succeed in including, 
empowering, and creating trusting relationships with local communities. The history of 
land-based conservation in Tanzania offers a vital lesson about the importance of local 
involvement. Indeed, it is imperative that coastal conservation efforts do just that, as 
marine management will only be successful when efforts fully understand not only the 
complex ecological processes involved, but the many socio-economic factors directly 
affected by coastal governance decisions (Torrel 2000:354).  
 Understanding the roots of conservation in Tanzania can help us to place coastal 
conservation efforts within a more complex and accurate historical and post-colonial 
context. It allows us to more fully understand the situation in which conservation efforts 
are taking place, including what potential attitudes and hesitations to the projects might 
look like from local communities. If conservation initiatives can more accurately 
anticipate and mitigate these kinds of issues, they are more likely to gain the trust and 
partnership of local communities, and thus to be successful in implementing coastal 
conservation initiatives that foster ecological health and community empowerment.  
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Chapter 4: Practices and Case Studies of Coastal Conservation 
A. Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Marine Protected Areas  
In this chapter I seek to paint a broad picture of coastal conservation in order to show the 
ways in which it is different from land-based conservation practices and to provide a 
global context in which to situate the particular case of Zanzibar. I do so in two ways: 1) I 
discuss two of the primary concepts that are used in marine resource conservation and 
management and 2) I provide global, regional, and national case studies of conservation 
initiatives in order to create a broader perspective of such efforts.  
 First, the principles and objectives of Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
(ICZM) (also sometimes referenced to as ICM) must be outlined, as ICZM serves as the 
foundation (at least in theory) for many of the marine conservation efforts across the 
globe. The concept of ICZM was first established in 1972 when the United States passed 
the Coastal Zone Management Act; the term “integrated” was added in the early 1980s. 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil launched ICZM into the international spotlight. One of the priorities of the 
conference was the protection of coastal environments; it was argued that all countries 
should commit to implementing integrated management and sustainable development of 
coastal areas (Lindén 1993a). Thus began an increased worldwide effort to implement 
ICZM-based management of coastal resources. ICZM has been popular in many regions 
of the world since the Rio Conference; as of 2000, approximately 95 coastal nations were 
engaged in ICZM projects, 70 of which were developing countries (Tobey et al. 2002: 
286).  
 A distinctive aspect of ICZM is “multiple use management and inter-
organizational activities where success depends on coordination of efforts and effective 
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linkages among the actors involved” (Tobey et al. 2002: 288). ICZM is, at the core of its 
mission, a participatory and collaborative process. It aims to partner state, civil society, 
market actors, and local communities. ICZM strives to create place-based solutions 
through participatory involvement and community empowerment (ibid). 
 One of the most common manifestations of ICZM at the local scale is through the 
creation of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). The World Conservation Union defines 
MPAs as “an area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and 
maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and 
managed through legal or other effective means” (ibid.). While this definition requires 
that an area be put aside for conservation, it does not dictate what else it can be used for; 
commonly they have additional purposes, such as promoting better livelihoods, 
education, or research (ibid.). It is estimated that there are approximately 1,300 MPAs 
worldwide, 28 of which are found in East Africa (Tobey et al. 2006: 835).  
 While the above discussion shows the rhetoric surrounding ICZM and MPAs to 
be quite promising, the actual on-the-ground manifestations of such projects are not 
always successful in meeting their goals of community inclusion and empowerment. It is 
important to recognize that while coastal conservation in Zanzibar is a distinct case, there 
are many unique cases from the global south that involve parallel groups of stakeholders 
grappling with similar issues. Local and indigenous communities in many regions are 
struggling to access marine resources against a complex backdrop of postcolonialism, 
poverty, and development. In order to place Zanzibar within this larger setting, I explore 
five case studies—from India, New Zealand, South Africa, Kenya, and Tanzania. 
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B. Case studies of marine conservation  
 
Kanyakumari District, India 
In her book Shorelines: Space and Rights in South India, Ajantha Subramanian (2009) 
details the struggle of a fishing village in the Kanyakumari District of Southwest India to 
claim their rights to marine resources. She discusses the particular history of the case 
study in order to show how the “lineage of rights” informs the current situation within its 
postcolonial setting. She begins with the history of early traveler accounts from around 
400 A.D., moves on to the Portuguese expansion into the area in the 1500s and the 
resulting establishment of the Catholic Church and conversion of coastal communities, 
and continues through the period of British colonization to current times. This detailed 
history paints a clear picture of how roles and relationships have formed between fishers 
and those in power in the region, as well as how fishers express their rights and claim 
their resources within the existing power structures. 
 The Catholic Church has played a significant role in the region since the sixteenth 
century, as it has served as the “landlord, tax collector, and religious authority— an 
imposing trinity that has served as the primary intermediary between the fishing 
population and successive rulers” (Subramanian 2009:2). It was thus significant when, in 
1997, a group of artisanal fishers took their bishop to court over a clerical decision to 
institute a week-long ban on local fishing in response to locals’ attack on the mechanical 
trawling boat of a nearby village. This violent attack was in violation of a peace deal that 
the church had brokered in the region, and the ban was to serve as a type of punishment 
for the actions. However, the fishers in the village who instigated the attack felt that the 
church had overstepped its authoritarian bounds and in an unprecedented move took them 
to court. Not only does this story paint a picture of the power relationships between state, 
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church, and local communities, it also details the power struggle between artisanal fishers 
and those who use more destructive trawling practices. 
 In her telling of this story, Subramanian makes three key arguments. First, she 
argues that current claims to resources in India’s post-colonial democracy are fed by the 
“histories of claim making” in the region; she argues that it is a fluid process of 
negotiation and political subjectivity. Second, she argues that in their efforts to claim 
their rights, fishers in the region not only renegotiated space, they created new spaces in 
which to fight for justice (i.e. in the creation of a three mile fishing zone that was made 
accessible to only artisanal fishers). She argues, “…space itself is an essential ingredient 
in the struggle for rights” (Subramanian 2009: 252). Third, Subramanian suggests that in 
their ability to create new space, they also resisted and recreated traditional hegemonies. 
She goes on to argue that within development efforts, the state “…opens up new spaces 
for the articulation of subaltern rights and sovereignty” (ibid.: 254). Finally, she 
concludes that this case study shows that: 
…an approach to conservation simply as state science or a community practice is 
inadequate for sustainable resource use. The thorough implication of states and 
communities through the development process suggests that any effort to redress 
the ills of development has to be a joint one (Subramanian 2009: 254, italics 
added). 
 
 While this story is specific to India, we can apply the lessons learned to the 
Zanzibar case in a couple of important ways. It can help us to recognize that resource 
rights and access in Menai Bay are steeped in a long and complex history that must be 
understood in order to accurately frame current dynamics in the conservation area. 
Furthermore, this case study serves as a reminder that solutions cannot come from one 
stakeholder alone, but must be a joint process that includes all affected parties.  
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Kaikoura Region, New Zealand  
A second study comes from the Kaikoura region on the east coast of the south island of 
New Zealand. The indigenous Maori people in the area have long used the practice of 
rāhui to protect their natural resources (Maxwell et al. 2007:1). The practice of rāhui 
involves prohibiting the use of certain natural resources in a designated area in order to 
allow them to replenish for future use (ibid.). While the practice has changed 
significantly over time to reflect and cohere with modern political and conservation 
practices, the survival of the practice is a success story in and of itself. The process was 
severely eroded during the English colonial period, but there have been recent successes 
in implementing rāhui in conjunction with the New Zealand government. The 1996 
Ministry of Fisheries Act gave the government the right to close certain areas (or at least 
restrict types of allowable fishing methods) at the request of local communities, in order 
for those communities to manage certain resources with traditional methods (Maxwell et 
al. 2007: 9). The same 1996 act set up an official process for requesting a rāhui (ibid.). 
 The official Kaikoura rāhui that this case study involves was approved in 2002 in 
order to take pressure off of marine resources that had become overused in the region. 
This case is interesting in that it successfully uses indigenous traditions in order to 
implement conservation practices in a contemporary, government-sponsored setting. 
However, it is important to note that there are other factors involved (namely government 
legislation) that can keep the local communities of the region from fully practicing the 
marine conservation practices that they desire (Hemmingsen 2004: 80). Thus, while this 
case highlights the success of merging the desires of local stakeholders with those of the 
government, challenges to a fully cohesive system are still present.  
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 This case study reminds us that even when traditional methods are used in 
conjunction with the government, they are still enacted within a power structure where 
local communities are often subordinate. While the Maori clearly have some agency, they 
are not completely free to conserve and manage resources in the ways that they would 
like. This situation echoes the conversation on the “new” era in conservation, in which 
local desires are recognized but often not fully actualized. While the success of this story 
should not be undervalued, it must be recognized that there are still hegemonic issues of 
power at play. This can provide important context for how we define true success in the 
case of local access to and control of resources in Zanzibar. 
 
Great St Lucia Wetland Park, South Africa 
Post- apartheid South Africa offers a particularly interesting case study of coastal 
management from the African continent. While technically its eastern coast forms part of 
the East Africa Marine Eco-region, South Africa varies greatly from East Africa for a 
variety of political, social, and ecological reasons. Divisions of race and power under 
apartheid had great influence on how the country’s environmental management efforts 
were enacted (Picard 2003: 182). As a result, most relationships between protected areas 
and surrounding black communities were full of mistrust and conflict (ibid.). The country 
still struggles to end the negative perceptions of protected areas instilled in black 
communities during the apartheid era (Picard 2003: 183). However, at the end of 
apartheid new efforts were made to more fairly distribute earnings from protected areas 
to previously excluded black communities (ibid.).  
 The Great St Lucia Wetland Park (GSWP) covers an area of 300,000 ha and is 
located in the Province of Kwa Zulu-Natal, 240 km north of Durban (Picard 2003: 183). 
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Originally established in 1895, GSWP contains marine, inland lake, estuarine, forest 
dune, mangrove, and costal lowland forest ecosystems. The park is home to Africa’s 
biggest estuary, its largest population of hippo and crocodiles, the last significant 
breeding ground for the giant leatherback and loggerhead turtles, 526 bird species, and 
220 km of coastline and beaches (www.stlucia.org). Nelson Mandela reportedly said that:  
[Great St Lucia Wetlands Park] must be the only place on the globe where the oldest land 
mammal (the rhinoceros) and the world’s biggest terrestrial mammal (the elephant) share 
an ecosystem with the world’s oldest fish (the coelacanth) and the world’s biggest marine 
mammal (the whale) (www.stlucia.org).  
 
GSWP is managed by The Wetlands Park Authority which has three main objectives: (1) 
The management of the wildlife and ecological systems of the area, (2) Oversight and 
development of commercial activities that include nature-based tourism and associated 
infrastructure in the park; and (3) Improving the social and economic living conditions of 
people living in the area (Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2005: 72). 
 Picard (2003: 189) argues that many black South Africans living in this region 
now see real benefit to having GSWP and are in full support of its survival. While the 
extent to which local communities have been involved in and benefited from 
management of the park is not made explicit (nor could I find other scholarly work on 
this topic), Picard suggests that the level of involvement has been enough to change the 
largely negative perceptions of conservation efforts that existed during the apartheid era. 
The Wetlands Park Authority reports numerous ways in which GSWP has supported 
local communities. These efforts have included paying 30,000 Rand (approximately US 
$3,500) to 556 families that were forcibly evicted from the park in the 1950s; this was an 
important step in compensation for past wrongs, however the families were not allowed 
to resettle in the park (Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2005: 73). The 
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Park Authority also set aside a site within park bounds for the villagers to use to honor 
the ancestors they have buried there (ibid.). Additionally, local communities receive a 
percentage of gate revenue generated from tourism, some access to resources within park 
boundaries, jobs (both permanent and temporary), and training in development and 
tourism activities (Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2005: 74). Even so, 
poverty levels in communities in the region remain quite high, with only a small 
percentage of people receiving direct benefit from the park.  
 While these successes are respectable, Picard argues that if conservation efforts 
like GSWP are to succeed in a majority ruled South Africa, then protected areas will need 
to further strengthen their level of engagement with local residents. She concludes that, 
“the GSWP cannot solve poverty and underdevelopment, but it can contribute to solving 
problems, while ensuring its own continued success by recognizing and engaging local 
residents as equitable partners in biodiversity conservation” (Picard 2003: 190). 
 This case study is pertinent because it shows us the implications of inequitable 
and unjust coastal conservation schemes, as well as how difficult it can be to solve the 
resulting problems over time. Even though there are efforts to right past wrongs in 
GSWP, it’s clear that these efforts have fallen short of truly overcoming injustices 
resulting from the creation of the park. While the case of Zanzibar will never involve 
issues as extreme as apartheid, there are certainly (slightly) more subtle power dynamics 
that keep local communities in a place of less power than those implementing the 
conservation initiatives. Therefore, it is important to remember the potential long-term 
consequences of not recognizing or including local communities in a truly just way 
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consequences that can be of great detriment to the long-term success of the conservation 
program. 
 
Diani-Kinondo Region, Kenya 
The Southern coast of Kenya has similar resources, weather patterns, and fishing histories 
to its Southern neighbor, Tanzania. As of 1995, approximately seven percent of Kenya’s 
population (1,640,000 people) lived on the coast; this percentage has most likely 
increased significantly since that time. As in Tanzania, a large majority of coastal 
dwellers are Muslim, and many are of Swahili ethnicity (Glaesel 2000: 323). While some 
of the conservation initiatives also look similar between the two countries, there have 
been some major differences in the roles of and relationships between stakeholders. 
Exploring these similarities and differences will help place the Menai Bay Conservation 
Area and other MPAs in Tanzania within a broader regional context.  
 The Kenyan government began coastal conservation efforts in the 1960s, when 
they set aside the country’s first marine parks. The number of marine parks continued to 
increase throughout the next three decades (Glaesel 2000: 329). However, unlike many of 
the marine parks in Tanzania that at least initially had the support of local communities, 
most fishers residing in communities in or near the protected areas of Kenya have long 
disliked the parks for two reasons: 1) some communities lost access to the waters they 
had historically fished, severely limiting their right to use traditional fishing grounds; and 
2) the people put in management positions in the parks have mostly been outsiders from 
other communities who have formal education that most coastal villagers lack, causing 
resentment (ibid). Partially because of their animosity toward the parks, local 
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communities sometimes continue to fish in protected waters, choosing either those areas 
that are poorly patrolled or fishing under the cover of night. This, unsurprisingly, has 
created further conflict between local fishers and park officials. 
 Furthermore, Glaesel (2000) has found that the creation of marine parks in Kenya 
has created tension between local and non-local fishers all along the Kenyan coast. While 
most local fishers use traditional techniques such as baskets and cast nets, newcomers 
often utilize more environmentally destructive methods such as speargunning and pull 
seining (Glaesel 2000: 322). The conflicts between locals and non-locals have occurred at 
a variety of levels, from locals barring outsiders from joining cooperatives to the use of 
arson and the destruction of fishing gear (ibid.). 
 The Kenyan government has focused on coastal conservation schemes that 
recognize and include local communities, mostly through the establishment of numerous 
marine reserves that prohibit the use of speargunning and seining, but that do allow more 
traditional methods (Glaesel 2000: 322). While these regulations are in place to support 
local fishers, these efforts have not always been welcomed; many fishers resent the 
intrusion of the national government into what has traditionally been regulated at the 
local level (ibid.). Furthermore, these regulations against non-local fishers have not 
always been strictly enforced, as some seiners have formed strategic relationships with 
government officials that prevent them from being prosecuted for using illegal methods 
in protected waters (ibid.). As a result of the combination of loss of access to waters 
because of marine park establishment, the depletion of local fish stocks as a result of 
practices such as seining, and the loss of an increasing percentage of beachfront territory 
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to new tourist hotels, local fishers now view themselves as an oppressed group that bears 
the brunt of the detrimental affects of coastal development (Glaesel 2000: 333).  
 McClanahan et al. (1997) offers an excellent case study of the complexity of 
implementing effective management strategies in the coastal waters of Kenya with her 
discussion of the Diani-Kinondo region on the Southern coast. The majority of the people 
who live in Diani-Kinondo are of the Digo ethnic group; the group has elaborate and 
long-standing traditional methods for managing coastal resources (McClanahan et al. 
1997:116). Such traditions include: (1) the safeguarding of marine sites that are 
considered to be sacred; (2) the designation of certain periods during the year when 
fishing is curtailed for religious purposes; (3) the requirement of non-local fishers to pay 
local communities for access to their fishing grounds; and (4) traditions that dictate 
restriction on gear and the size of fish that can be caught (ibid.: 115). While these 
traditions sound promising, comparative ecological studies of the Diani-Kinondo region 
and nearby marine parks found a much greater level of biodiversity and fish health in the 
protected areas. While traditional practices in the area may have been more effective in 
the past, a decline in the power of cultural institutions has severely hindered their 
potential for success. McClanahan et al. (1997:116) suggests that a merging of traditional 
systems of management with government supported and enforced policies would be 
needed for successful protection of these vital, declining coastal resources. Thus, creating 
a marine park under the principles of ICZM might prove the best option for the 
preservation of the Diani-Kinondo marine ecosystem. 
 Many different parties actually supported a proposed marine park in the region in 
the early 1990s, including local fishers, hoteliers, and researchers (McClanahan et al. 
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1997: 106). The local fishers supported the plan even though it would severely limit their 
access to traditional fishing grounds, as they hoped that the marine park would generate 
community income from park fees. However, the project eventually lost popularity with 
fishers and local government officials for numerous reasons, including: (1) a fear that the 
park would be expanded into an even larger area of traditional fishing grounds, and (2) a 
realization that the park may not deter outside fishers from invading local waters, as they 
had hoped (ibid.: 108). As of 1997, the environmental management plan for the region 
was inactive, which speaks to the complex challenges inherent to successfully 
establishing conservation efforts in coastal East Africa. While it is possible that 
improvements have been made since this time, my research could find no scholarly 
evidence that this was the case. This case study provides a regional context for MBCA, 
and helps to illuminate the complex relationships that can exist between local 
communities and government institutions. Furthermore, it speaks to the realistic difficulty 
of implementing successful long-standing conservation initiatives in the region.  
 
Mafia Island Marine Park, Tanzania 
The final example comes from the Mafia Island Marine Park (MIMP), located 60 
kilometers south of Dar es Salaam, and 21 kilometers east of the Rufiji Delta in the 
Indian Ocean. While Mafia is similar to Zanzibar in many ways, it is politically affiliated 
with the mainland. It is located within the main flow of the dominating East African 
Coastal Current, and boasts a high diversity of marine habitats. Mafia communities 
depend on coastal resources for their livelihoods, and the area has long attracted visiting 
fishers as well. Concern over the depletion of local waters from destructive fishing 
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practices, such as dynamite fishing, prompted the establishment of MIMP in 1995. MIMP 
covers an area of about 822 km2, making it the largest Marine Park in the Indian Ocean 
(Tobey et al. 2006). The Park operates under the principles of ICZM, seeking to improve 
the ecological integrity of the region while simultaneously improving the livelihoods of 
local communities.  Of the 40,000 people in the Mafia District (comprised of five 
individual islands) about 13,500 live within the park, many of whom depend on the 
marine environment for food and income (Andersson et al. 1995). Only people from 
Mafia are allowed to fish in the park; a permit is required and laws against destructive 
fishing practices are reportedly strictly enforced (Tobey et al. 2006). “Before the 
establishment of the Marine Park in 1996 and purchase of patrol boats, Mafia Island was 
reported to be like a ‘war zone’ with blasts every half-hour” (Tobey et al. 2006: 844). 
One blast from dynamite fishing kills nearly all fish and other living organisms within the 
15- 20 meter radius of the blast, and destroys all of the coral reef within a couple of 
meters (ibid.). 
 Some researchers report clear successes of MIMP. Coral mining and destructive 
fishing techniques have been greatly reduced through education, illegal gear exchange 
programs, the use of boat patrols, and local community participation (Kamukuru et al. 
2004). A study done by Kamukuru et al. (2004) shows that there are four times more fish 
of at least one important species, the blackspot snapper, than in the adjacent heavily 
fished areas. Additionally, the biomass of these fish is generally six to ten times greater 
than that of the fish sampled outside of the MPA. The findings suggest that the same is 
likely true for other fish species in the area. While this study indicates that the MPA has 
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been good for the ecological health of the region, others have found that the results of 
MIMP have not always been positive.  
  As mentioned in Chapter 2, anthropologist Christine Walley conducted an 
extensive study of the social impacts and feelings toward the creation of the Mafia Island 
Marine Park from 1995-2000. She published her research in the book Rough Waters: 
Nature and Development in an East African Marine Park, which highlights not only the 
“social drama” of the marine park itself, but also how the experiences of MIMP fit into 
the larger discussion of globalization, conservation in Africa, and the power dynamics 
between governments, NGOs, and local communities (Walley 2004). 
 In Rough Waters, Walley explores the relationships and power dynamics between 
local communities, the World Wildlife Fund (the major international organization 
involved in the park) and the Tanzanian government. Walley’s findings show that during 
MIMP’s initial years, community members were pleased with the efforts of the park, 
even though they were often excluded from the “participatory” aspects of management. 
However, by 2000 she saw a clear waning of support from local residents, often finding 
vehement dislike and distrust of park regulations and officials. This shift was a result of 
villagers feeling that their access to vital resources within the park was diminishing, as 
well as the heightened realization that their ability to “participate” in the development 
and management of the park was merely superficial. Walley now indicates that 
dissatisfaction with the park has grown and intensified, even leading to violent conflicts 
between villagers and park officials (Walley 2009, personal communication).  
 What is perhaps most notable in the story of MIMP is that despite the animosity 
from local residents toward the park, those in positions of power consider it a success. 
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Park documents from 2000 indicate that the park was functioning well. Yet, as Walley 
says: 
It is deeply ironic (and disturbing) that during the time in which official organs were 
asserting that the park was functioning at its best, Mafia residents, whose voices 
would remain unheard in national and international offices, were declaring their 
hostility toward the park and insisting that it was waging a “war” against them 
(Walley 2004: 252). 
 
 We can apply many lessons from Mafia Island Marine Park to coastal 
conservation in Zanzibar, including the insight that biological success does not 
necessarily equal social success. However, what is perhaps most important to take away 
from this case study is Walley’s final findings from MIMP. Her research reminds us that 
the stories told by those in government and others in positions of power (including those 
in international conservation organizations) can differ greatly from the actual on-the-
ground stories told (and lived) by residents of the protected areas. It will be important to 
keep this mind during the discussion of Menai Bay and the relationships and power 
dynamics between the many stakeholders involved in conservation there.  
 Each of these case studies provides unique insights into the complex realities of 
implementing Integrated Costal Zone Management projects in real-life settings. They 
also provide lessons that we can use to better understand and analyze the thesis’s primary 
case study, Menai Bay Conservation Area. In the remaining four chapters, I introduce the 
particular case study of MBCA, including my own findings from fieldwork in the region. 
I then combine the lessons learned from these case studies with the theory of political 
ecology in order to critically analyze how well conservation initiatives in MBCA are 
meeting the goals of ICZM, with a particular focus on the goal of fostering community 
empowerment in the protected area. In using a political ecology approach, I will attempt 
to further enrich the understanding of the challenges of ICZM provided by the case 
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studies in this chapter. Furthermore, these questions will help us to more fully understand 
the dynamics and implications of the current state of conservation in Menai Bay. First, 
however, it is important to discuss the history of Zanzibar as it pertains to conservation 
areas like MBCA.  
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 Chapter 5: History, Politics, and the Environment in Zanzibar  
A.  A brief history of Zanzibar 
This chapter provides the historical and political context necessary to understand the 
current state of conservation in Zanzibar. The first section gives a brief overview of the 
history of Zanzibar, which serves as a backdrop for the current political tensions 
surrounding conservation efforts in the region. The second section details the history of 
the relationships Zanzibaris have with their environment; it highlights the fact that 
notions of resource conservation and management did not arrive with external western 
entities, but are rather deeply engrained in Zanzibari society. With this understanding, we 
can better grasp the history of traditional conservation methods on the island and the way 
they inform current environmental protection efforts. Finally, the third section of the 
chapter highlights how the current political context can complicate and impede 
conservation efforts in Zanzibar.  
  The history of the Swahili people who make up a majority of Zanzibar’s 
population is a topic that has long been debated by historians, archeologists, 
anthropologists, linguists, and other scholars. However, we can comfortably say that 
Swahili speakers inhabited the East African coast by the end of the first millennium, 
living in a scattered but fairly homogenous and largely maritime culture (Spear 2000: 
286). Trade is thought to have existed along the coast since the first millennium; there are 
clear accounts of Roman trade on the southern coast of Zanzibar as early as the 5th 
century, and evidence of Persian trade there dating back to the 8th and 9th centuries (Spear 
2000:263). Evidence of Islam on the islands also dates back many centuries; the two 
oldest mosques on the island (in Kizimkazi and Tumbatu) date back to the early years of 
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the 12th century (Nehemia et al. 2000: 252).  
 It is important to note, however, that significant aspects of the typical scholarly 
history given of Swahili people (such as that above) conflicts with the traditional history 
told by Swahili people themselves. This is partly because identity is not a static thing in 
Zanzibar. Traditionally, “ethnicity could be inherited at birth, but it could also be adopted 
as necessary to meet the particular social, economic, and political goals of human actors 
as they negotiated their way through the complexities of real life” (Fair 2001: 29). 
Historically, inhabitants of Zanzibar have defined themselves in the way that allows them 
the strongest claim to resources at a given time (ibid.: 28). In fact many Zanzibaris, 
considered to be Swahili by the outside world, will not self-identify as such because it is 
associated with being a former slave; they instead claim descent from Persians or the 
original inhabitants of the areas of Hadimu or Tumbatu (Gilbert 2004: 15; Fair 2001: 36). 
While reconciling these two histories is not easy, it is likely that the answer lies 
somewhere in the synthesis of the two; this would posit that the Swahili emerged near the 
Northern East African coast in the first millennium and later became infused with Persian 
and Arabic culture and religion as a result of trade (Spear 2000: 290). Wherever the exact 
truth lies, it is certain that the Swahili have a long and rich history in the region. 
 Zanzibar too has a long and rich history. It was once a major trading crossroads 
for many regions of the world. Products that for the most part originated on the mainland 
and were brought to Zanzibar— such as for slaves, ivory, hides, and cloves and other 
spices— were bought and sold by merchants from across the globe. It acted as “a 
commercial intermediary between the African interior and the capitalist industrializing 
west” (Sheriff 1987: 1).  
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Here Yankee merchants from New England drove a hard bargain with 
Hindu traders in their large crimson turbans or Khojas in their long 
coats, exchanging ivory for American cloth; Marseillais haggled with the 
Somali for hides and sesame seeds from the Benedir; Hamburg 
entrepreneurs shipped tons of cowries shells to West Africa, where they 
served as currency; and Arab caravan traders rubbed shoulders with their 
African counterparts from the Mountains of the Moon (Sheriff 1995:1). 
  
 In part because of its central role in global trade, many have sought to rule the 
islands over time. The Portuguese were the first external power to successfully take hold 
of leadership in Zanzibar; they came to power in the late 1500s and ruled through the 
already existing local dynasty (Sheriff 1995: 8). But by the mid-1600s their power in the 
region was already beginning to give way to the Omanis who finally expelled the 
Portuguese completely in 1698 (ibid.). The Omanis ruled for nearly two hundred years, 
solidifying Zanzibar’s relationship with Islam and the Middle East. It also solidified the 
distinction between Arabs and Africans on the island, sorting them into respective 
categories of “ruler and ruled” (Larsen 2004 : 131). Under the Omanis, land use policies 
began to change on the island, as the agricultural economy shifted from one of 
subsistence to one of cash crops (Nehemia et al. 2000: 266). Whereas there used to be a 
general policy of shared equal rights to land among all people, policies of land ownership 
took over and the Africans became more marginalized with less access to land (ibid.). 
This, in part, help set the stage for later conflict between Africans and Arabs. 
 The Omanis succumbed to British rule in 1890, but Sultan Ali was retained as 
acting leader of Zanzibar (Gilbert 2004: 68). The Sultan’s government was supposed to 
maintain control over internal affairs on the islands, however the British soon took over 
even local administrative duties (ibid.). Thus, while Zanzibar was called a protectorate, it 
looked more like a British colony (Fair 2001: 14). The British further stratified the island 
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into ethnic categories of Arabs, Asians, and Africans. The consequences of such 
categorizations had great power, they even determined the type of food people had access 
to (Larsen 2004 : 131). Africans were considered the lowest ethnic rung on the ladder, 
further marginalizing them and setting the stage for conflict between the groups. Zanzibar 
remained a British protectorate with an Arab-ruling party until independence in 1964. 
Shortly thereafter, a bloody revolution took place in which the African majority 
overthrew the Arab minority. Thousands of people, mostly Arabs, died in the Revolution 
(Gilbert 2004: 158). While the killings were directed at overthrowing the elite ruling 
class, many poor Arab shopkeepers were also victims of the violence (Sheriff 2001:314). 
The party that took power after the Revolution, CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi, literally 
the Revolutionary Party), has been in office since that time.3  
 Shortly after taking power, the new Revolutionary Government formed a union 
with the mainland country of Tanganyika, officially creating The United Republic of 
Tanzania, of which Zanzibar remains a semi-autonomous entity. While there is a two- 
party democratic system in Tanzania— the opposition party is the Civic United Front 
(CUF)— it is generally thought that CCM has only retained power through a series of 
fraudulent elections. The tension between these two parties is palpable in Zanzibar. Party 
politics on the island often serve as a divide between the CCM government and more 
CUF-dominated villages and within communities themselves. As we shall see in section 
three of this chapter, these government-community relationships have huge implications 
                                                
3 CCM wasn’t officially created until 1977. The party that formed the government 
directly after the revolution was the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). The ASP joined with the 
ruling party on the mainland, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), to create 
CCM in 1977. However, CCM- rule on Zanzibar was a direct continuation of APS-rule.  
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for Zanzibar, and not least of all for the success of conservation and development 
initiatives in the region.  
B. The history of human-environment relationships in Zanzibar 
Conservation and resource management are not new concepts in Zanzibar. Zanzibaris 
have an intimate knowledge of their local ecosystems, as their livelihoods have long 
depended on the health and abundance of their natural resources and they have long used 
measures to protect them. As McClanahan et al. (1997: 12) found in their study of coastal 
Kenya and Tanzania, “Traditional management embraces all the main forms of restriction 
practiced by modern fisheries organizations. These include gear restrictions, limited 
access (ubani), time limits (sadaka), size restrictions and sacred or protected areas 
(mzimu).”  
 In their study of Chwaka, a village located on the Central East coast of Unguja— 
Zanzibar’s largest and most populated island— Tobisson et al. (1998) found the depth of 
environmental knowledge among villagers to be vast. While Chwaka is only one village, 
their findings can easily be extrapolated to the rest of the region, as the social, political, 
and ecological settings of Chwaka are generally similar to those of the rest of Unguja. 
While Chwaka villagers don’t necessarily use western scientific terms to discuss their 
environment, their knowledge of such things is indisputable. They understand the 
relationship between the tides and the revolution of the moon, as well as the patterns and 
scientific characteristics of precipitation, winds, and intertidal zones (Tobisson et al. 
1998). This knowledge is based on “generations of accumulated experiences” (ibid.: 
681). It is important to recognize the depth of this knowledge, particularly in light of top-
down conservation schemes that sometimes assume ignorance drives people to destroy 
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their own ecosystems. Or, who use the “ritual caveat (‘ poverty forces them to degrade 
the environment’)” (Bryant 1997: 6).  
 Indeed, I encountered the view that Zanzibari people are ignorant in regards to 
their environment during an interview with one official of the Menai Bay Conservation 
Area (MBCA). He told me that when MBCA was founded, there was a huge need for 
education, because local people had little “scientific knowledge” about the sea or 
environment in general (anonymous, Interview, 7/30/2009). He claimed that many people 
believed that fish fell from the sky with the rain and that the fact that they only landed in 
the sea simply proved that they were from god (ibid.). He said, “Not everyone 
understands what is happening naturally,” or what should be done to conserve it (ibid.) 
This, of course, conflicts sharply with the findings of Tobisson et al. above. It illustrates 
the power dynamic that exists between government officials and local communities, one 
that allows those in power to inaccurately frame local communities as ignorant and in 
need of external help with resource conservation and management. This idea is explored 
more in later chapters of the thesis. First, the below examples of traditional resource 
management practices further illustrate a more accurate view of the long-standing history 
of environmental knowledge and conservation in Zanzibar. 
 One of the oldest outside accounts of traditional resource management practices 
in Zanzibar comes from a report by R.H.W. Pakenham, British Senior Commissioner for 
Zanzibar during the 1940s. In his report on land tenure practices in Chwaka, Pakenham 
found that fishing was one of the “foremost occupations” of the Shehia (district), and 
generally of people throughout Zanzibar (Pakenham 1947: 28). In fact, he found that the 
number of fishermen at the time was increasing significantly from earlier periods. This 
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increase, Pakenham found, was due in part to a new road that connected the area more 
easily with the other parts of the island (and the subsequent new markets that this made 
available for the “disposal of catches”). This made fishing a more lucrative form of 
employment than agriculture and thus more people began to turn toward the sea for their 
livelihood.  
 Also around this time, fishermen stopped using more distant fishing grounds “as 
their fathers did” and also began to abandon the former practice of closing heavily fished 
areas for two or three years in order to allow them to replenish (Pakenham 1947: 28). 
This all combined to result in a “decline in the quantity and average size of fish obtained” 
as compared with the generation before. This study is of note for two reasons: 1) it points 
to traditional forms of management that are at least old enough to be in decline by the 
1940s and 2) it provides early evidence of the degradation of fishery resources in 
Zanzibar due at least in part to the loss of traditional forms of conservation.  
 Another case study from Chwaka focuses on historic forms of mangrove 
conservation in the region. In 1946, eight villages around Chwaka Bay formed a 
community-based mangrove council to regulate the cutting of shrinking forests in the 
region (Williams 1996: 8). Those wishing to harvest mangroves first had to seek a permit 
from the council; if someone was found to be illegally harvesting mangroves there was a 
strict penalty of a ten-year jail sentence (ibid.). During this time, the government of 
Zanzibar also made development funds available to the villages, which helped to further 
reduce dependency on the mangroves. The local government and local village councils 
managed the mangroves together by making joint decisions on when the forests were 
unhealthy enough to warrant closure; these closures could last for more than 10-15 years 
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(Williams 1996: 8). However, over time there has been an immense shift in how these 
decisions are made; with more and more power resting with the government. As a result, 
whereas villagers used to perceive “…the mangroves as being theirs” they “now see the 
mangroves as belonging only to the government” (ibid.). Furthermore, it is reported that 
whereas the mangroves used to be “large and plentiful,” they are now being deforested at 
an alarming rate. This case argues, then, that not only does locally based or joint 
decision-making give people a sense of ownership over their resources, it also leads to 
more effective conservation measures in Zanzibar. 
 Tobisson et al. (1998) show how other traditional forms of conservation practices 
in Chwaka have eroded over time. For instance, until the late 1960s there was a prawn 
management system in place in the mangroves near Chwaka, which they co-managed 
with a neighboring village. During hatching season, the area was closed for two to three 
months; the policy was well respected by community members (Tobisson et al. 1998: 
684). However, over time, Chwaka villagers claim that the system broke down for two 
reasons: 1) the authority of their elders deteriorated due to increased importance of 
government regulation, and the government viewed the sea as common property that 
couldn’t be managed at the village level and 2) an influx of newcomers came to the 
region, many of whom did not respect the local management system (Tobisson et al. 
1998: 684). As a result, the prawn populations around Chwaka have been severely 
damaged, and in turn so has the income of fishers.  
 Likewise, the management system for crab fishing has been degraded in Chwaka 
due to increased demand and technological improvements (Tobisson et al. 1998: 684). 
Whereas only the Indian population of the island previously ate crabs in large quantity, 
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the growth of tourism has increased this demand sharply. Furthermore, whereas 
harvesting of crabs used to be limited to low water during spring tide, snorkels and other 
new equipment have made it possible to collect them at any time (ibid.). While I do not 
want to suggest here that new technology is a bad thing for these fishers, I would argue 
that because new methods don’t fit easily into the traditional management systems, they 
have the potential to do significant damage. These examples begin to tell the story of 
traditional management practices in Zanzibar that have been rendered ineffective due to 
both external pressures and new developments that could not have been accounted for at 
the time the systems were put in place. At least in part due to this degradation of local 
management systems, every fisherman interviewed for Tobisson et al.’s study claimed 
that their fish catches have declined in both number and size (Tobisson et al. 1998: 684). 
Thus, the breakdown of these systems has had hugely negative implications for the 
people and environment in Chwaka.  
 Finally, we turn to a more recent case of community implemented conservation 
measures in the Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA), the primary study site for this 
thesis. MBCA is located directly south of Chwaka and presumably shares many of the 
traditional forms of resource management already discussed in this chapter. In the 1980s, 
fishers in Fumba, one of seventeen villages in the region of Menai Bay, established their 
own conservation committees to combat illegal fishing practices in the region that were 
destroying the local fish populations (Levine 2006: 133). There was no outside 
sponsorship of this program; villagers themselves contributed money and time in order to 
patrol the waters for people using illegal fishing practices. In 1992, they expanded the 
committees to five surrounding villages.  
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 A couple of years later, these committees were abandoned in order to form new 
ones under the more formal auspices of the World Wildlife Fund and Government of 
Zanzibar, as a result of the creation of MBCA (Levine 2006: 133). However, as will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 6, most of the resources for the MBCA are funneled through 
“show case villages” that are much more accessible to tourists and donors than the area 
around Fumba. As a result, villagers in Fumba report feeling “abandoned” by the project 
(ibid.). Even though their initial attempts at conservation prompted the formation of 
MBCA, they now receive minimal support from the conservation project, and destructive 
fishing practices are reported to be on the rise again in the area of the village. This is 
another (albeit more recent) example from Zanzibar of externally driven conservation 
efforts diminishing the effectiveness of more traditional community-based methods of 
resource management.  
 The point here is not to argue that traditional methods of conservation are always 
perfect in Zanzibar, or that outside projects are always bad. Indeed, as the first case study 
shows, the effectiveness of some traditional management methods were already in 
decline in some areas as early as the 1940s, long before any kind of large scale marine 
conservation initiatives were in place. What can be said conclusively here is that 
Zanzibaris have a long and knowledgeable relationship with their environment. 
Furthermore, they have long put in place conservation and management schemes to 
protect natural resources, as their livelihoods depend on the health of these ecosystems. 
The importance of these traditional forms of management should not be overlooked or 
discounted; as these case studies show, the implications of doing so can be negative for 
humans and ecosystems alike. A final case study from the Jozani-Chwaka Bay 
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Conservation Area takes this discussion a step further to show how the political situation 
further complicates conservation efforts in Zanzibar. 
C. The politics of conservation  
Politics in Zanzibar can have great influence over conservation and development 
initiatives there. Jozani-Chwaka Bay Conservation Area (JCBCA) provides a good case 
study of the ways in which the political situation can negatively impact conservation 
efforts on the islands. JCBCA began in 1993 as a collaborative project between the 
Austrian government, Care-Tanzania, and the Government of Zanzibar (Myers 2002: 
151). From the onset, the park sparked a great deal of animosity from local communities. 
A major reason that villagers disliked the conservation area was because it offered 
protection to the endemic species of red colobus monkey that inhabits the region, and 
which destroys villagers’ crops (Williams 1997: 15). Furthermore, in the beginning of the 
project the villagers were not compensated for the resulting rise in crop damage. 
Ironically, the loss of crops led to villagers’ increased reliance on forest extraction for 
income, further fueling deforestation of the quickly diminishing mangrove resources in 
the area that the government was attempting to conserve (ibid.).  
 In part to help mitigate some of these problems, JCBCA attempted to establish 
community-based environmental committees to oversee conservation and alternative 
income generation initiatives. A couple of these committees did have some success, 
particularly with developing some ecotourism projects in the area. The government and 
local environmental committees of the villages of Jozani and Pete built a boardwalk 
through the forest for tourists to see the mangroves and monkeys. Funds generated by the 
boardwalk go toward development projects in the two villages. However, there are both 
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environmental and social problems underlying the initiative. One official from the 
Department of Forestry told me that from the boardwalk it looks as though the mangroves 
are being conserved, and yet if you go just a couple of meters away, there is quite a bit of 
deforestation (anonymous, interview, 7/23/2009). Socially there are problems too; 
benefits from the park are unevenly distributed amongst community members, making 
support “far from unanimous” (Myers 2002: 153). Thus, even though there has been 
some amount of success on the part of the committees, even these are fraught with 
problems (ibid.). Furthermore, the other conservation committees in JCBCA have for the 
most part been deemed completely ineffective (ibid.) 
 Many of the problems with the committees, and with conservation efforts in the 
area in general, originate from the deeply seeded political issues that can be found 
throughout Zanzibar. While Chwaka is located in an area that has been officially 
affiliated with CCM, it is thought that in reality many villagers align themselves with the 
opposition party, CUF. (Myers 2002: 154). The divide between people of the two parties 
seeps into everyday life in Chwaka, making cooperation among villagers a real challenge. 
This, among other things, makes it difficult to implement effective community-based 
management projects (ibid.: 156). “The JCBCA and its environmental committees are 
incapacitated by party politics, participants’ intervening livelihood struggles and 
villagers’ relationships with JCBCA’s sate-based and internationally financed origins” 
(Myers 2002: 154). We can thus conclude two things from this case study: 1) it further 
shows that top-down conservation schemes that disregard local needs and traditional 
management efforts often fail to gain the support of local communities and are thus 
rendered ineffective and 2) the political divide between CUF and CCM is a tangible force 
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on Zanzibar, one that has strong potential to hinder true community-based conservation 
efforts. Furthermore, Myers goes on to say that this trend is true in many regions of 
Africa and that, “in the current context of political tension and crises, few communities 
are ‘ready’ for projects like this” (Myers 2002: 157).  
 As this chapter shows, the concepts of conservation and resource management 
were not brought to Zanzibar by western entities. While Zanzibaris may use different 
language to discuss environmental issues and take slightly different approaches than 
those conventionally used in the west, conservation has a long history within Swahili 
culture. They are practices that, while not always perfect, have served the double function 
of sustaining both resources and livelihoods throughout generations. However, in many 
cases these more traditional forms of conservation have declined in effectiveness over 
time. This decline is in part due to the increased centralization of control to the 
government and the resulting loss of emphasis on community-based forms of leadership 
and resource management. Furthermore, the tensions between the political parties in 
Zanzibar have further weakened the effectiveness of community-based conservation 
projects in general. The political divide can exist between the CCM government and 
CUF-dominated villages (in terms of lack of support), as well as within individual 
villages themselves (as we saw with the case of Chwaka). As we will see even more 
clearly in later chapters, these issues have helped to create a context in which it is 
extremely difficult to implement effective community-based conservation schemes.  
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 Chapter 6: Menai Bay Conservation Area and the Marine and Coastal 
Environmental Management Project 
A. Menai Bay Conservation Area 
The first section of this chapter introduces the primary case study of the thesis, the Menai 
Bay Conservation Area (MBCA). The second section of the chapter details the 
background and objectives of the Marine and Coastal Environmental Management 
Project (MACEMP) that is currently responsible for funding a major conservation 
initiative in MBCA. The Menai Bay Conservation Area is located in the southwest region 
of Unguja, the main island of Zanzibar. It is the largest Marine Protected Area (MPA) in 
Zanzibar, covering an area of 467 km2. The MPA is home to large numbers of coral reefs, 
sea grass beds, and mangrove forests. The conservation area is managed by the 
Government of Zanzibar and has received significant financial and technical assistance 
from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) (EcoAfrica 2005: viii). Furthermore, Menai Bay 
recently began receiving a large amount of funding and oversight from the Global 
Environmental Facility of the World Bank as a part of MACEMP, which is discussed in 
detail in the second section of this chapter.  
 The population of the conservation area rose from 11,324 in 1998 to an estimated 
27,000 in 2005; this increase in population has had a significant impact on the health of 
the local marine ecosystem (EcoAfrica 2005: 10). The MPA encompasses 17 villages 
(EcoAfrica 2005: 37). Both men and women of the region partake in marine-based 
activities that provide sustenance and household income. Results from a survey done in 
the conservation area found that roughly three-quarters of total household income is 
“derived from the sale and trade of marine and coastal products” (The World Bank 2003: 
6). Many residents also take part in the growing tourism industry of the bay; 15,000-
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20,000 foreign tourists visit the conservation area each year for snorkeling and dolphin 
watching (Torrell, et al. 2006: 4). While the people of Menai Bay tend to be quite poor, a 
2003 study shows that the lifestyle in MBCA actually tends to be slightly better than in 
other parts of rural Tanzania (Tobey, et al. 2006: 840). 
 Menai Bay saw a large decline in fish stocks during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
which is thought to have occurred as a result of rising food demands in Zanzibar and Dar 
es Salaam. Annas Massoud, the Manager of Menai Bay, said that fishermen came to the 
Department of Fisheries for help in the early 1990s (Massoud, interview, 7/30/09). He 
said that whereas they used to go out to sea for a couple of hours and catch 20 kilos of 
fish, by the early 1990s they were fishing for a full half of a day and catching only 5 kilos 
(ibid.).  
 This decline led to the establishment of an informal community-run monitoring 
project to help curb the use of destructive practices such as dynamite fishing; it was 
initiated by the village of Fumba and a few of its neighboring communities, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. Their initial management plan included the forbidding of 
destructive fishing practices, community monitoring of resource depletion, and an eight-
month closure of their dago, or fishing camps (EcoAfrica 2005: 62). However, the 
community members had difficulty enforcing any kind of regulations due to lack of 
training and resources (Torrell, et al. 2006: 7).  
 The Government’s Commission of Natural Resources then invited the WWF to 
come help with these efforts; in 1994, they began to provide support in MBCA. They 
aimed to both help the government with management efforts and to provide 
environmental education for local communities. Massoud said, “If we are to remember 
69 
WWF in Zanzibar it will be for education” (Massoud, interview, 7/30/09). In 1996, the 
first stakeholder meeting was held to discuss the official formation of the Marine 
Protected Area (MPA). The meeting included the departments of the Environment, 
Tourism, and Education, as well as local fishermen, a few tour operators, and district 
government officials. Among other topics, the group discussed what the name of the 
MPA should be. They talked about calling it Fumba, on behalf of the village that began 
the conservation efforts, but they wanted it to be more encompassing of the region. They 
agreed on Menai Bay Conservation Area because the straight between the Fumba 
Peninsula and the main island is referred to as Menai Straight in old sea maps of the 
region (Massoud, interview, 7/30/09). 
 The government officially gazetted the bay as a conservation area in 1997. The 
park was received with mixed feelings from different parties, with local communities 
being mostly in favor of the new designation and non-local fishers being the unhappiest. 
While fishing is not excluded anywhere in MBCA, there are stricter regulations on what 
types of fishing are allowed than in the rest of Zanzibar. The goals of MBCA are to: (1) 
protect the marine ecosystem and improve resource yields through management systems 
that include active local community participation; (2) involve local communities in 
planning, implementation and monitoring of the natural resources; (3) increase awareness 
of conservation through educational and public awareness programs; and (4) support 
biological and socio-economic research and monitoring to provide the basis for rational 
management (Torrell, et al. 2006: 9-10).  
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Figure 6.1 Menai Bay Conservation Area  
 
(Torrell, et al. 2006: 5) 
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 There are three levels of management in MBCA. At the local level, Village 
Conservation Committees (VCCs) have been established in every community. They work 
in cooperation with local leaders (Shehas) and a village-based officer from the 
Department of Fisheries to identify the needs and concerns of their particular village. 
They are then responsible for, “articulating the views and concerns of the villages to the 
project team and the management and steering committees, and their aim is to ensure full 
village participation in project activities” (EcoAfrica 2005: 64). The District 
Conservation Committees (DCCs) then brings the concerns and needs of the VCCs to 
District authorities. There are 15 or so staff members from the Department of Fisheries 
that are responsible for daily management and patrolling of the area (ibid.). 
 During the 2002-2003 financial year, 90 % of the funding for MBCA came from 
the WWF, with the remaining 10% coming from the government of Zanzibar (EcoAfrica 
2005: 65). However, this has changed significantly with the start of MACEMP, as 
discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter. In 2001, a fee structure was 
established that allocated 70% of all revenue collected in the area to management and 
30% to the development of community activities proposed by the DCCs (ibid.). 
 MBCA has seen some important successes. For example, employees of MBCA 
use a patrol boat and hand-held radios funded by the WWF to regulate the protected 
waters; this has proven to be fairly effective in deterring illegal fishing practices in a 
large portion of the park (Torrell, et al. 2006: 10). Additionally, certain fish stocks in the 
region are on the rise (ibid.).  
 One of the most promising developments in the park, in socioeconomic terms, is 
the growth of the tourism industry, which is mainly based on dolphin watching 
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excursions. This has created some increased revenue in the area and has also helped to 
take some pressure off of marine resources, as some former fishermen now take tourists 
out to sea to view and swim with the dolphin pods who frequent the bay. However, 
because most of these excursions leave from the village of Kizimkazi Dimbani, the 
benefits are fairly concentrated in that village. Furthermore, one study (McCauley 2003, 
unpublished), found that sixty-six percent of all revenue generated from the dolphin tours 
stays in Zanzibar Town— the island’s major urban center— where most of them are 
organized. 
 The MPA continues to face other major hurdles as well, in terms of both 
ecological health and livelihood improvement for local residents. Degradation of 
numerous aspects of the marine ecosystem is still evident. Underwater, there has been 
significant damage to coral reefs, in part due to fishing boats, anchors, nets, and the use 
of certain fishing practices such as spearing (EcoAfrica 2005: 11). Above water there is 
obvious damage to mollusk populations and mangroves (ibid.). These ecological 
problems are largely attributed to social issues that are resulting in increased stress on 
marine resources. These include: poverty, lack of education, lack of livelihood options, 
increased fishing pressure due to the growing population, and lack of proper enforcement 
of conservation area regulations. (EcoAfrica 2005: 13).  
  Social and livelihood issues in MBCA largely stem from a lack of resources. For 
instance, there is often a lack of funding to actually carry out the income generating 
initiatives formulated by the VCCs; likewise, there is limited funding for patrol boats and 
other important monitoring resources. While there is a $3 fee required of every tourist 
who visits the park, these are sometimes not collected by guides. Even when they are 
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collected, they don’t always trickle down to the villagers, in part because the protected 
area is so large (Torrell, et al. 2006: 12). Other problems stem from bureaucratic issues 
that result because multiple government agencies and organizations have a role in the 
management of resources.  
 As of 2004, research found that community feelings toward the park varied 
drastically between different villages, largely due to the unequal allocation of resources 
(Levine 2006:123). The villages furthest from the patrol boat headquarters—including 
Fumba, the island that sparked the conservation initiative to begin with— report feeling 
“abandoned” by the project and claim that illegal fishing is on the rise again in their 
region of the park. Part of this issue arises from the creation of “show case villages” used 
to show tourists and donors the “success” of the project (Levine 2007: 575). These 
villages tend to receive more resources in order to better illuminate the success of the 
project, and they also tend to be the villages that are already more accessible to major 
roads that connect to the island’s urban center of Zanzibar Town. As a result, the least 
marginalized villages receive the most funds (and in addition, tourist visits), while the 
neediest receive the least (Levine 2007: 575; EcoAfrica 2005: 68). It seems that: 
…Ensuring publicity, whether through publishing glossy reports and 
brochures or through the creation of showcase villages, can become 
more important than actual programme results, causing programme 
resources to be channeled in ways that are not conducive (and 
sometimes even detrimental) to building local capacity (Levine 
2007:579). 
 
 Thus, while the establishment of MBCA has curbed some illegal fishing practices 
and other factors implicit in the degradation of coastal resources, it has yet to fully solve 
the causative problems of poverty and lack of livelihood options (and the deeper 
underlying social and political forces creating such issues). These issues will be discussed 
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in more depth in the remaining chapters of the thesis. This chapter now turns to one of the 
major projects addressing coastal conservation and livelihood improvement in the region, 
the Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project. 
B. Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project 
Background, objectives, and implementation  
Governments are rarely the sole monetary sponsors of coastal conservation initiatives. 
Large nonprofit organizations and international assistance institutions such as The World 
Bank have financially supported many ICZM projects around the world; one estimate 
says that the World Bank alone has given over $500 million to such efforts (Tobey et al. 
2002: 286.). They are certainly a major player in coastal management in Tanzania, 
particularly through their Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project 
(MACEMP). MACEMP is a $75 million, six-year project that began in 2005 to: 
Improve the regulatory and institutional framework for management of 
marine resources- particularly establishing the links between the marine 
environment and the fishery resource and what are expected to be 
conservative estimates of sustainable commercial exploitation of marine 
fishery resources. It also aims to fill gaps in the data describing the fishery in 
Tanzanian marine waters and the coastal and offshore environment upon 
which the fishery depends (The World Bank 2003: 5). 
 
 At this point, it is difficult to tell an unbiased story of the establishment of 
MACEMP, as the World Bank or Government of Zanzibar has commissioned nearly all 
of literature on the Project. While this makes for a partial view of MACEMP’s 
background and objectives, it nonetheless gives an important overview of the goals of the 
project. The most comprehensive of these documents is the Environmental and Social 
Assessment of MACEMP (ESA) (Gustavson, et al. 2005), created by an external 
environmental consultancy group for the United Republic of Tanzania. The ESA draws 
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heavily from many of the other documents created for the project, and so is used to 
provide much of the information on MACEMP found in this chapter. 
 There are three main components of MACEMP. While Components 1 and 2 are 
of great interest and importance, Component 3 is most relevant for the purposes of this 
thesis, as it focuses on the well-being of communities impacted by the project. Each of 
the components is described briefly in the table below (Gustavson et al. 2005: 9-13): 
Component Objectives 
Component 1: Sound 
Management of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) 
Implement a common governance regime for the EEZ, 
increase revenue from the EEZ, develop resource 
management strategy for the EEZ 
Component 2: Sound 
Management of the Coastal 
and Marine Environment 
Support ICZM efforts, Support comprehensive efforts 
to create MPAs and other marine management areas, 
Increase total area under protection 
Component 3: Coastal 
Community Action Fund 
Establish the Coastal Village Fund in partnership with 
Tanzanian Social Action Fund (TASAF) to empower 
communities to create and sustain projects that work to 
improve local livelihood options and the sustainable 
management of marine resources 
  
 MACEMP focuses on a number of areas throughout coastal mainland Tanzania 
and Zanzibar, including Menai Bay Conservation Area. As seen from Figure 7.1, the 
other regions included in the project are the Rufiji-Kilwa-Mafia Complex, the trans-
boundary MPA with Mozambique (Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary area), Latham Island, 
Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area, and the Pemba Channel Marine Conservation 
Area (Gustavson, et al. 2005: xi). 
 In order to implement its conservation and resource management strategies, 
MACEMP partners with numerous government agencies and development organizations. 
In Zanzibar, the government agencies responsible for implementing the project are the 
Department of Fisheries, the Department of Environment, and the Department of 
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Commercial Crops, Fruits and Forestry (ibid.). One of the primary aid organizations that 
MACEMP partners with is the Tanzanian Social Action Fund (TASAF); they collaborate 
to implement projects that support community-based initiatives that compliment 
Component 3 of the project. The objective of TASAF is to “empower communities to 
manage interventions that contribute to improving their livelihoods” (Gustavson, et al. 
2005: 64). TASAF states that it “is guided by the principles of community demand driven 
development and follows a bottom up planning and decision making through community 
empowerment” (www.tasaf.org). They support projects focused on improving such things 
as access to health, education, and water services, public works, and alternative income 
generating activities for vulnerable communities and individuals (ibid.; Gustavson, et al. 
2005: 64).  
 A major aspect of Component 3 is the funding of sub-projects that are aimed at 
improving the lives of communities impacted by the project. The types of sub-projects 
funded under MACEMP include: fisheries development, aquaculture development, the 
development of shore-based processing and marketing, and other industry-based 
developments such as eco-tourism (Gustavson et al. 2005: 85). However, as we will see 
in the next chapter, the process of funding these sub-projects is quite complicated, 
begging the question: how successful are these efforts in creating true alternative 
livelihood options?  
Expected outcomes and recommendations for success 
The Environmental and Social Assessment (ESA) expects numerous results from the 
implementation of these three project components, both positive and negative. They 
include (chart adapted from Walmsley et al. 2004: 11): 
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 In order to ensure as many positive outcomes as possible, the ESA makes several 
recommendations. These include:  
• MACEMP should serve as the link between all donor-supported coastal conservation 
and management initiatives;  
• A strategy should be put in place that will educate all stakeholders, increase 
environmental awareness, and create a sense of ownership over the Project;  
• There must be better training of local government officials;  
• A review of current community-level projects relating to MACEMP should be 
undertaken in the participating villages;  
• Local communities should be engaged early on in the mitigation process, paying 
special attention to existing imbalances of power within those communities;  
• Environmental assessments should be conducted before any sub-projects are 
implemented;  
• There must be better training of local environmental officials so that they are able to 
conduct such environmental assessments;  
• And, there should be training and placement of mariculturalists at the district or 
regional level to help implement management plans and reduce conflict between 
resource users (Gustavson et al. 2005: 83-84).  
 
 
  
 It is important to consider how the ESA arrived at these expected outcomes and 
Potential Positive Impacts Potential Negative Impacts 
• Increased and improved welfare of 
communities through poverty 
alleviation;  
• Enhanced financial sustainability in the 
communities;  
• Improved social capital within 
communities as a result of planning;  
• Increased capacity for co-management 
and reduction of vulnerability in 
communities to impacts;  
• Ensured longevity to the resource base 
for financial and livelihood 
sustainability; and  
• Ecological protection of key coastal 
areas. 
• Loss of access to marine resources in a 
particular area (i.e., displacement);  
• Loss of habitual land and water uses;  
• Change to the quality and/or quantity of 
a resource a household can access;  
• Change in the seasonal access of the 
resources;  
• Change in the nature of access (e.g., 
unregulated to regulated); and  
• Change to the types of assets needed to 
access resources (e.g., banning certain 
fishing gear). 
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recommendations. The data was collected in two ways. Information was gathered through 
already existing documents (many of which were created specifically for this project), as 
well as through interviews with “key stakeholders” (Gustavson et al. 2005: 31). These 
interviews covered a range of topics, including: “livelihoods (existing and alternative 
livelihoods); consultation and communication processes; conflicts and dispute resolution; 
and monitoring and evaluation” (ibid.). The interview process also sometimes included 
mapping exercises to help individuals identify important community resources and 
activities. These interviews “targeted individuals that were particularly knowledgeable of 
the district in question or of identified valued components, and who could speak to the 
issues affecting specific stakeholder groups as a whole” (ibid.). The ESA does not 
indicate how informants were determined to be particularly knowledgeable.  
 Multiple stakeholder interviews were held in September 2004 throughout the 
MACEMP region, including one in Menai Bay Conservation Area (in the town of 
Kizimkazi) with members of the fisheries committee and local fishers. Concerns 
discussed by the interviewees are detailed in the ESA, but they are not broken down by 
region. However, it is still interesting to look at the main concerns that were identified 
among the stakeholders. Some of note included: the difficulty for fishers to participate in 
other livelihood activities because they live in a fishing culture, lack of appropriate gear 
(especially for deeper offshore waters), the need for development of local fish markets 
and storage facilities, the need for capital for development of alternative livelihood 
activities, the need for “buy in” from the grassroots level, better communication about the 
project from the implementing agencies, and the conflict between the need for nutrition 
with the overuse of marine resources (Gustavson et al. 2005: 91-94).  
79 
 While the ESA claims to speak to solutions for each of these concerns, along with 
all others listed in the document, it is not made clear how they will be addressed in a 
tangible way. As will be seen in the following chapter, my fieldwork shows that there is 
little evidence that these concerns are being effectively dealt with in MBCA, or that 
alternative livelihood improvement schemes are being implemented in an effective 
manner. Comparing the language of the project documents with the actual results of the 
project will help us to understand the true level of success of MACEMP, particularly in 
terms of community empowerment. While the ESA and other related documents paint a 
hopeful picture of a conservation project that empowers and improves the lives of coastal 
communities in Tanzania, we must critically ask if this is the case, or if the project is just 
another example of top-down conservation-as-usual. 
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Chapter 7: Fieldwork Findings 
A. Opinions of MACEMP 
This chapter uses fieldwork conducted in Zanzibar to better understand how the Marine 
and Coastal Environmental Management Project (MACEMP) is meeting its goals of 
community empowerment in the Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA). The first part 
of the chapter focuses on general feelings toward MACEMP, based on interviews 
conducted during July and August 2009. The second part of the chapter looks more 
critically at the discrepancies between the language used in the MACEMP literature and 
what my interviewees told me is actually happening in MBCA. In this section, I also take 
a critical view of the processes of community empowerment recommended by the 
literature, in an attempt to understand their likelihood for success.  
 I found mixed opinions of MACEMP during my fieldwork; feelings about the 
project generally fell into three camps. Some people were largely in favor of the project; 
they felt that it is having a fairly significant and positive impact on local communities in 
Menai Bay. Another group animatedly disliked MACEMP; they felt that it has fallen 
short of its promises and potential. A third group was also critical of the project, but their 
criticisms went beyond MACEMP and were aimed at large-scale aid and development 
work happening in Zanzibar more generally. These people were skeptical of projects 
implemented by agencies like the World Bank. As one interviewee told me, “the problem 
in Africa is sustainability,” meaning that many projects fail because that are not 
sustainable in the long-term (anonymous, interview, 8/4/09). While consideration must be 
given to all perspectives, it is interesting to note that the interviewees who fell into the 
third camp tended to be upper level government officials and scholars who have had a 
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great deal of experience working with projects such as MACEMP. Viewpoints from each 
of the three camps are explored below. 
 A few of my interviewees felt that MACEMP is a successful project. For instance, 
one retired official from the Department of Fisheries had mostly positive things to. He 
feels that the marine resources of Menai Bay are healthier due, at least in part, to the new 
policies put in place by the project to prevent the use of destructive fishing gear 
(anonymous, Interview, 7/27/09). He also thinks that one of the most important 
components of MACEMP is its effort to reduce poverty through improving fishing 
practices and creating alternative income opportunities. Examples of successes he 
mentioned include access to better fishing gear (such as improved nets and outboard 
engines so that fishing boats can travel further out to sea), fertilizers to help with 
agriculture, supplies to start bee keeping initiatives, seedlings to help replant mangroves 
cut for fuel and building purposes, and chickens to begin animal husbandry projects.   
 Likewise, Shehah Hamdan, the MACEMP project coordinator for the Department 
of Fisheries, feels that there has been a lot of positive “interventions” by MACEMP at the 
local level (Shehah Hamdan, Interview, 8/3/09). He said, “People call MACEMP a 
project, but really it’s a program.” Hamdan pointed out that there have been over 200 
community level projects implemented as a result of MACEMP; he emphasized that if 
each of the 200 projects impacts 10-20 people, there is a lot of benefit created for local 
communities. 
 On a final positive note, a local employee of the MACEMP project in Kizimkazi, 
Khalfan, also painted an optimistic picture of MACEMP during our interview. He said 
that there is increased patrolling of illegal fishing activities because there are now more 
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patrol boats as a result of the project (Khalfan, Interview, 8//8/09). He added that now 
people know the waters are being better patrolled, and so are less likely to try to fish 
illegally. Finally, Khalfan said that the fishers have a few new fishing boats as a result of 
the project, each with outboard engines so the they can get further out to sea and thus 
relieve pressure on the oft-fished near-shore areas. 
 As mentioned above, I also encountered quite a bit of negativity and 
disappointment about the project. For instance, the same retired official from the 
Department of Fisheries who generally feels that MACEMP has been a success also sees 
problems. Primarily, he thinks that there is a noteworthy amount of corruption in the 
upper levels of leadership (anonymous, Interview, 7/27/09). He said, “[The] auditor is the 
same as the accountant, no one can follow the proper use of funds.” The retired official 
argues that money and goods do eventually get to everyone, but in smaller amounts than 
they should because of the corruption at the top levels. Similarly, the former Director of 
the Department of Surveys and Urban Development for the Government of Zanzibar told 
me that because MACEMP is nationally managed and based in Dar es Salaam, no one in 
Zanzibar is completely responsible for the expenditure of allocated funds and so there is a 
lack of accountability (Makame Muhajir, Interview, 2/5/10). The people who are 
responsible are on the mainland and so misuse of money in Zanzibar is not necessarily 
seen (ibid.). This matches the pre-MACEMP findings of Levine in the region, when she 
says, “priorities and accountability flow outward towards international sponsors rather 
than inward to the local level. It is difficult for these programs, externally defined and 
executed across multiple communities in multiple regions, to account for local 
particularities...” (Levine 2006: 7). 
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 Hamisi, who among many other related activities worked as a research assistant 
on a project analyzing conservation practices in MBCA, feels that MACEMP is a 
disappointment because it had so much potential, but has actually done very little 
(Hamisi, Interview, 7/29/09). In his opinion, a lot of this is because there is a disconnect 
between local communities and the people in charge of the project. He feels that no one 
actually talked to the fishers to see what they think realistic solutions to over fishing are. 
Hamisi also sees a problem with the lack of feedback that local people are able to give 
about the project. He says that there is no chance for evaluation to see if projects have 
been successful. Finally, Hamisi argues that everything about the project is “too big” 
(ibid.). He feels that MACEMP came in with huge ideas that sound great, but they can be 
difficult to implement locally. Sometimes what is important, Hamisi feels, is to think 
small and realistically. He thinks that the big money and big ideas actually take away 
from local progress and local success.  
 Others criticized the literature produced by the project. One official in the 
Department of Environment commented that it is important to realize that MACEMP is 
producing a lot of nice pieces of literature, but when you really look at it, most of it isn’t 
original research; it’s merely citing other literature (anonymous, interview, 7/16/09). This 
indicates, he argues, that they’re not really doing on the ground research, and so don’t 
really know what’s happening or what’s needed. Likewise, an official in the Department 
of Fisheries told me that he thinks that a lot of the literature on socioeconomic status 
produced in relation to MACEMP was not scientifically or conclusively studied 
(anonymous, interview, 8/3/09). Therefore, he thinks that the baseline documents may 
not provide precise data and will thus make accurate evaluation difficult. 
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 I also heard quite a bit of doubt about the effectiveness of the alternative 
livelihood projects implemented as a part of MACEMP. Hamisi said that the project 
gives people goats to create alternative income generation, but that that doesn’t create 
enough additional income to keep people from fishing and therefore doesn’t actually help 
take much pressure off of the marine ecosystem. Along similar lines, an official with the 
Department of Tourism wondered how the project can ensure that people are getting 
enough out of alternative livelihood projects to really take the pressure off of marine 
resources? If you can’t do this, he wondered, then what’s the point of the project 
(anonymous, interview, 8/4/09)? Likewise, an official with the Department of Fisheries 
told me that he sees a lack of alternative income generating projects in all of Zanzibar’s 
MPAs (anonymous, interview, 8/3/09). He argues that the projects put in place don’t 
actually provide enough income for local people; he would like the government to 
conduct a study on how much money such projects actually generate in order to 
determine if it is enough to actually relieve pressure on marine resources. 
 Other people were wary of those implementing the project. One of my 
interviewees, a respected Zanzibari scholar, commented that you have to know whom the 
conservation projects actually benefit. He said that you have to be sure that conservation 
is good for the local people, not for the “overseers who want a kickback” (anonymous, 
interview 8/7/09). The official with the Department of Tourism told me that he generally 
doubts all World Bank projects, because of their history and their large-scale perspective. 
He quipped, they “use the same prescriptions for all diseases” (anonymous, interview, 
8/4/09). He was also skeptical about whether or not MACEMP could become self-
sustaining. Finally, a scientist with the Institute of Marine Sciences of the University of 
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Dar es Salaam, who has done extensive scientific work in the region, told me that she 
thinks the people in charge of MACEMP haven’t done anything with money yet. Also of 
note, she doesn’t think that many local communities within MBCA are actually in favor 
of the project (anonymous, interview, 7/10/09).  
 As seen from these interview findings, opinions of MACEMP vary widely. While 
these interviews are not substantial enough to be considered statistically significant, they 
do make it clear that there is a great deal of concern over various aspects of the project, 
including how it engages with local communities. Furthermore, many of these concerns 
stem from a more general apprehension toward large-scale development initiatives. In the 
next section, I juxtapose the language of the project documents with such concerns. 
Additionally, I provide a critical look at the feasibility of implementing the community 
empowerment initiatives suggested in the MACEMP literature.  
B. Rhetoric versus reality  
Conservation literature the world over is ripe with rhetoric of community empowerment. 
Large-scale donors, NGOs, and governments all speak to the importance of community-
based conservation efforts. Yet, it is often left unclear just how such empowerment is to 
take place. This trend is true in Zanzibar, too. As Levine points out, Zanzibar’s 
Environmental Management for Sustainable Development Act, which has substantial 
impact on the policies of the MPAs there, “provides a role for local communities in the 
management of natural resources, but does not elaborate or provide guidance on how to 
implement that objective” (Government of Zanzibar 1997, as cited in Levine 2006: 65). 
Thus, we can see that the legislature on protected areas in Zanzibar fosters a sense of 
ambiguity about exactly how to include local communities. While the MACEMP 
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literature attempts to give tangible ways to do this, I will show that in the end it only 
leaves us with a deeper sense of vagueness.  
 Throughout the MACEMP literature, there is strong language about the 
importance of community empowerment. The below examples emphasize this point: 
From the Process Framework for the Marine and Coastal 
Management Project:  
 
The operational structure and institutional mechanisms associated with the 
implementation of MPAs are sometimes exclusionary with respect to local 
communities, especially when driven by national and international 
interests. There may be little involvement by local communities and little 
local input to decisions on user or access rights to the resources within the 
MPA. To avoid this type of model, which can result in hardship and conflict 
in local communities, MPAs should be developed with greater attention to 
community participation, seeking to ensure a long-term sustainability of 
programs promoting an integration of conservation development. As the 
goal of MACEMP is to establish this type of inclusion activity within 
coastal communities and to ensure that the economic well being of local 
communities remains the same or is improved…clear mechanisms for 
communication and consultation with affected local communities are key. 
(Walmsley 2004: 13) 
 
From the Rapid Assessment of Menai Bay Conservation Area: 
 
It must be stressed that any attempt to circumvent an inclusive and 
thorough management planning process will create a vacuum in which the 
key tool for management will be missing (EcoAfrica: 57) 
 
From the outset, however, it must be accepted that a Management Plan for 
the MBCA cannot be drawn up in isolation from its users. Equally 
important, it must be realized that a management plan is not an end in 
itself; rather, what is important is to follow an inclusive and thorough 
process to arrive at a management plan that has the buy-in of all the 
relevant parties…This is very different from a plan drawn up by 
consultants, or by one or two government officials with only a few copies 
available and no one knowing what it is anyway (ibid.) 
 
Community participation is a key aspect to take into consideration in future 
decisions if the MBCA is to reach its objectives of sustainable and 
integrated development and bring benefits to local communities (ibid., 65).  
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 These and countless other examples, peppered throughout MACEMP-related 
documents, show the extent to which the importance of community inclusion is 
recognized. Not only is the importance of this recognized, but the implications of failing 
to do so are also clearly discussed. However, this begs the questions: what are the 
tangible ways in which communities are being included and empowered? In my research, 
I found two primary suggestions for enacting community empowerment: through already 
existing Village Conservation Committees (VCCs) and through the development of 
Community Mitigation Action Plans (CMAPs). However, as we will see in the end, while 
both of these options may sound good on paper, neither is effective in reality. 
 
Village Conservation Committees 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the VCCs have a great deal of responsibility in the 
management of Menai Bay, including that of expressing their communities’ needs to 
more upper levels of management. The Rapid Assessment of Menai Bay Conservation 
Area (MBCA) says:  
 Community participation is a key aspect to take into consideration in future 
decisions if the MBCA is to reach its objectives of sustainable and 
integrated development and bring benefits to local communities…The 
preparation of the final version of the MBCA Management Plan needs to 
involve communities through ample consolations and through direct 
involvement of VCCs… (EcoAfrica 2005: xix) 
 
 Furthermore, a document written by two employees of the Department of 
Fisheries states, “The [VCCs] are involved at different levels of fisheries management, 
with virtually every management decision enforced by the government having taken their 
consensus into consideration” (El Kharousy et al. n.d.: 6). These documents paint a clear 
picture of the VCCs as essential tools for community involvement. Indeed, the Manger of 
Menai Bay told me that they were established to try to empower local people to act at the 
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village level (Massoud, interview, 7/30/09). As part of belonging to VCCs, some 
members have been taken to Mafia Island Marine Park and other MPAs to see how 
marine parks work in other regions. According to Massoud, when they see the success of 
these other places, they become really supportive of conservation efforts and spread the 
word to other community members in their home villages (ibid.).  
 However, in my research I also found that the VCCs are ripe with problems. The 
government document quoted directly above goes on to identify numerous problems with 
the VCCs. These include: conflicts with other stakeholders over appropriate conservation 
regulations; opportunism (particularly in terms of using inside knowledge of boat patrol 
schedules and routes for their own benefit); kinship issues that arise when VCC members 
are expected to regulate their own family members’ fishing practices; not communicating 
clearly with their communities’ about important information; and, not engaging closely 
enough with their communities to be able to understand their needs and requests (El 
Kharousy et al. n.d.: 6). 
 Likewise, some interviewees spoke of their concern over the effectiveness of 
VCCs. One official in the Department of Fisheries that I spoke to feels that the VCCs are 
starting to loose their original meaning; a large part of this, he argues, is that the 
government now has too much influence over the committees (anonymous, Interview, 
8/3/2009). This is due to the fact that VCC members are taken to meetings and 
conferences and given other perks, and thus they are likely to agree with what the 
government wants in order to continue to benefit from their positions as committee 
members. So, according to the official, the government can easily get VCCs to agree to 
the projects and regulations that they want to implement, even if it’s not in line with the 
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desires and needs of their villages. Thus, the official argues, things look like they are 
“locally managed” and yet they are actually very much influenced by the desires of the 
government (ibid). He said that the “voice [of the VCCs] is being lost along the way” and 
that it would be better if they were totally independent from the government. Finally, he 
asserts that the committees don’t have any true power because at any point the 
government can overrule them and stop recognizing their authority; thus,  “it’s all 
artificial in the end” (ibid.).  
 I heard similar concerns from an official in the Department of Forestry, who 
talked with me about the VCCs in the Jozani-Chwaka Bay Conservation Area (JCBCA), 
located just north of MBCA. The official said, “Frankly speaking, I have not been 
impressed by [community-based projects]” (anonymous, Interview, 7/23/09). He pointed 
out that in the immediate vicinity of Jozani-Chwaka Bay there are 9 VCCs mandated with 
resource management of the conservation area, but there is still poaching and 
encroachment on protected areas. He argues that this is because the VCCs don’t have 
good capacity. He said, “[We] need to come up with real solutions” (ibid.).  
 These sentiments are echoed by the work of Myers (2002) in which he also found 
the conservation committees in JCBCA to be completely “incapacitated.” Furthermore, 
Williams (1997:15) argues that as a result of poor village government leadership, the 
VCCs in Chwaka “never properly formed.” Williams also found evidence of ineffective 
VCCs elsewhere in the region. In reference to those in the village of Ukongoroni he says, 
“The conservation committee does not yet have sufficient institutional strength and 
capability to address (with the aid of other external institutions) the complex socio-
economic and environmental issues faced by the village” (Williams 1997: 17). While the 
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VCCs mentioned above are not located in MBCA, they are a part of the same system and 
formed within a similar structure. Finally, in his research in three villages of MBCA, 
Meela (2001) found that the VCCs there were not able to successfully mobilize large 
parts of their communities to take part in conservation efforts in the bay (Meela 2001: 
66). Furthermore, he found that even when VCC- and other community-based meetings 
occur, not everyone is equally involved. Specifically, women are largely 
underrepresented, as these meetings are seen as a place for men and only a select few 
women who hold positions of power (Meela 2001: 65). Thus, even when the community 
is involved in decision-making, there is a clear gender division that gives most of the 
power and influence to men.  
 While these interviews are not statistically significant, they are congruent with 
other research done in the region. They begin to raise very real concerns about the 
effectiveness of VCCs, particularly if they are considered the focal point of community 
empowerment in conservation projects in Zanzibar. The document on the topic argues 
that when VCCs do not truly represent their communities: 
This results in the local fisher’s community feeling that the government is 
dealing with only the [VCC] and not the people the committees are 
supposed to be representing. The consequences of this are often infightings 
and skepticism towards the government from the local community (Levine: 
2004), and the inevitable breaking down of cooperation. (El Kharousy et 
al. n.d.: 9) 
A break down in cooperation has widespread implications for the general success of the 
conservation area, both ecologically and socially. Thus, based on this research, it seems 
that the VCCs are not helping MACEMP meet its goals of community empowerment.  
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Community Mitigation Action Plans 
According to the MACEMP literature, the Village Conservation Committees are not the 
only vehicle for community empowerment in MBCA. The Process Framework (PF) for 
MACEMP (Walmsley 2004: 14) outlines a clear method for community empowerment. 
The PF document was created by external environmental consultants “to serve as a guide 
through which activities and procedures related to MACEMP can be enhanced to 
incorporate the interests and needs of coastal community members and affected 
stakeholders” (ibid.: 3). It says that the purpose of the PF is, in part “to ensure that 
affected people have a meaningful role in [MACEMP] decisions and in deciding on and 
implementing alternatives to restore or improve livelihood and incomes affected by those 
decisions” (ibid.). Therefore, the PF is the document where we see the tangible ways in 
which the developers of the project hope to promote community empowerment.  
 The PF states that each community affected by MACEMP should have a 
Community Mitigation Action Plan (CMAP) in order to ensure that any negative impacts 
resulting from the implementation of MACEMP, such as reduced access to fishing 
grounds, is mitigated by the development of other income generating activities. The 
CMAPs are intended to be “community-driven, focused on facilitating alternative 
livelihood activities, and are to be submitted for approval” to the upper levels of 
management within MACEMP (Walmsley 2004: 14). In order to ensure that the plan is 
workable within MACEMP, they must include: proposed income restoration activities, 
organizational responsibilities, community participation, a schedule, a budget, and a plan 
for monitoring and evaluation of the proposed projects (ibid.). In order to ensure that the 
CMAPs meet these objectives, they are to be drawn up under the consultation process 
also laid out in the PF. The consolation process is an important element of the PF, as it “is 
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a mechanism for dialogue, decision-making and empowerment for coastal communities” 
(Walmsley 2004: 16). An general overview of the procedure can be seen in Figure 7.1.  
 As Figure 7.1 indicates, the process of consultation outlined in the PF (as well as 
the Community Mitigation Action Plans that are expected to result from the process) 
entails many steps, and appears to be extremely top-down in nature. While community 
members do have a role in implementing the mitigation plans, the actual development of 
those plans appears to be driven by those in upper levels of management within 
MACEMP. In addition to the top-down nature of this process, I see three other clear 
problems. 
 First, the consultation process seems like an incredibly cumbersome and 
convoluted task for each of the 17 villages within MBCA to take on, let alone for each 
village in Tanzania affected by MACEMP. It seems unrealistic to think that each of the 
five steps happened effectively in every village. Community leaders would need to be 
identified, communities would need to be organized, the procedure would need to be 
clearly translated into Swahili, and there would need to be an immense amount of 
cooperation from stakeholders with what are presumably differing goals and objectives. 
This problem of information dissemination was discussed by Meela’s findings on policy 
development in Menai Bay (pre-MACEMP). He found that information about newly 
formed policies did not reach all of the affected stakeholders (Meela 2001: 69). He said, 
“…People in communities along the coast of Zanzibar have limited access to information 
regarding policies addressed to them” (Meela 2001: 70). Furthermore, no one mentioned 
the CMAPs in my interviews, even when I asked government officials in charge of 
MBCA and MACEMP directly about community impacts of the project. This leads me to  
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Figure 7.1 CMAP Consultation Framework and Responsibilities 
 
(Walmsley 2004: 17) 
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believe that if this process is occurring at all, it has certainly not been the “clear 
mechanism for communication and consultation” it was hoped to be. 
 It is important to note here that I did see some evidence of community-requested 
mitigation activities, however they were much a result of more simplified process and on 
a smaller scale than talked about in the PF. During an interview with Annas Massoud, the 
Manager of Menai Bay, he showed me a large stack of requests for project funding from 
local villages in the protected area. He showed me how they must be stamped by the local 
VCC and the local Sheha in order to verify that the group or individual are really in need. 
Annas said that the requests tend to be for projects related to things like improvements to 
dispensaries, schools, and for the purchase of sustainable fishing gear (Annas Massoud, 
interview, 7/30/2010). He indicated that many of these requests were granted. Thus, there 
does appear to be some level of success with projects at smaller. 
 Second, and perhaps of more importance, is the concern that even if CMAPs are 
being drawn up for every village, could it possibly translate effectively in every place? 
Does this framework take into consideration the differing power dynamics and unique 
contexts that are inevitably found at every level of the process? As discussed with the 
VCCs, even when communities do have a voice, those of other stakeholders in positions 
of greater power can affect it. Furthermore, the communities in question likely don’t have 
one voice. There are power dynamics within each village, and stated desires and needs 
will vary depending on who is speaking for the community. As Walley reminds us: 
In general, the language of development found among international and 
national institutions tends to be abstracted from the social realities of 
particular locales and is often couched in technocentric terms that reduce 
complex socioeconomic and political issues to rationalized policy 
directives and generic solutions (Walley 2004: 227).  
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 I argue that Figure 7.1 is yet another generic example of top-down management 
plans that have given little thought to how such processes will play out on the ground in 
specific contexts. Thus, even if the consolation process is in place, what is the likelihood 
that it works? 
 Finally, if the ultimate purpose of the development of the CMAPs is to create 
“alternative sources of funding and support for the development of alternative livelihood 
activities” (Walmsley 2004: 14), then we should theoretically be able to determine their 
success based on the level of implementation of new livelihood activities. However, my 
interview results above suggest that there is a long way to go before alternative livelihood 
initiatives in MBCA can be called successful. Thus, even if the CMAPs are actually being 
implemented and they are working within specific community contexts to achieve 
empowerment, then it appears as though their efforts have yet to come fruition.  
 My findings are in line with what other researchers have found in the region of 
MBCA and in coastal Tanzania generally. While Levine’s work was done directly before 
MACEMP began, in her discussion of each of Zanzibar’s four Marine Protected Areas 
(including MBCA) she indicates that there was already a gap between rhetoric and 
reality. She says: 
The involvement and participation of local communities is…an explicit 
part of the rhetoric of each of Zanzibar’s protected area programs. 
Indeed, each program does have a community element and works in 
some way to provide benefits to local community members. Still the 
degree to which local residents are actually “participating” in these 
programs, or having real influence over program priorities, goals, and 
implementation, is questionable. Programs are largely designed from 
the outside...Community members have little real ability to affect 
program direction, strategies, or outcomes (Levine 2006: 199). 
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 Thus, MACEMP seems to be continuing along a trajectory that was already in 
place in Zanzibar. This is similar to Walley’s findings from her study of the Mafia Island 
Marine Park (MIMP), located off of the southern coast of Tanzania. As discussed in 
Chapter 5 of the thesis, that MPA saw a sharp decline in support from local communities 
as they came to the realization that their level of participation was merely superficial. 
Walley says: 
 Although some conservationists, including those involved in the Mafia 
Island Marine Park, are attempting to incorporate “communities” and 
“participation” into their planning, these concepts are easily conceived as 
generic slots to be fit into preordained projects while the socioeconomic 
and political processes at work are left unexplored (Walley 2004: 245). 
 
The consultation process of the PF seems to fit into this mold of conservation very well. 
There are clear slots in which different stakeholders are expected to neatly fit, all working 
together to create one unanimous goal. There appears to be no flexibility built in for the 
messiness of real life that will inevitably occur during implementation.  
 At this point, we can begin to draw many conclusions about MACEMP’s role in 
MBCA. My findings show that while there is some support for the project among 
Zanzibaris, there is also quite a bit of concern. Furthermore, even while the project places 
great emphasis on community involvement, in reality it is an extremely top-down project 
that proposes unrealistic means for achieving community empowerment. Furthermore, in 
the place where the potential for true community empowerment exists, the Village 
Conservation Committees, we find ineffective leadership and more top-down control 
from the government. While there are some examples of small-scale mitigation projects 
taking place, they are nowhere near the scale indicated as necessary by the MACMEP 
documents. These issues suggests that MACEMP is far from meeting its goals of true 
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community empowerment. Thus, I argue that while the rhetoric found in the MACEMP 
literature implies a new project with great potential to truly work with local communities, 
it is actually just another example of a top-down conservation scheme that cannot 
translate those goals into reality.  
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 Chapter 8: Conclusion 
A. Applying political ecology to Menai Bay Conservation Area 
In the first section of the chapter, I return to the political ecology literature presented in 
the Chapter 2 to show how it relates specifically to Menai Bay Conservation Area 
(MBCA). The second section of the chapter summarizes the current state of MBCA, as 
viewed from the perspective of the literature. In section three, I explore ways in which 
future research might more fully study the political ecology of Menai Bay, as well as 
some potential methodology for doing so. Finally, the fourth section offers concluding 
thoughts on the importance of approaching coastal issues in Africa from the perspective 
of political ecology.  
 Chapter 2 of this thesis outlined what a political ecology approach looks like, with 
an emphasis on work done in postcolonial Africa. Based on the literature presented in 
that chapter, the remaining chapters of the thesis have attempted to present the social, 
political, and historical information necessary to inform a political ecology understanding 
of Menai Bay Conservation Area. For example, Schroeder (1996) and Moore (1996) both 
speak to the importance of understanding not only the relationships among stakeholder 
groups, but also the “micro politics” that exist within groups, particularly at the local 
level. I have also attempted to do this with my discussion of the political divide that 
exists in many Zanzibari communities, and the negative impacts this can have on local 
cooperation with conservation and development projects in the region (Myers 2002).  
 Additionally, in line with Jarosz’s research (1996) on the how the French framed 
the shifting cultivation practice of the Malagasy of Madagascar as “irrational” during the 
colonial era, I have also tried to paint a picture of how those in power in MBCA have 
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framed local communities as the destroyers of their own resources; this dynamic is made 
evident in the discussion of the perception of local communities held by those in power in 
Chapter 5. Additionally, as with Jarosz’s work, I have attempted to show that local 
communities’ lack of cooperation in conservation projects is not necessarily resistance to 
conservation itself, but rather it can be resistance to those in power. As we saw in the 
work of Myers (2002) in the village of Chwaka, resistance to conservation is partially a 
result of a political divide. He asserts that even though people may recognize 
environmental problems, as well as how to solve them, “…political or educational 
matters prevent those people from acting in the interests of development and conservation 
for the good of the majority” (Myers 2002: 158). I would argue that this, at least in part, 
could be considered an act of resistance directed at the ruling political party in Zanzibar, 
which is responsible for the conservation project in Chwaka. 
 Chapter 2 also provided important cautions to keep in mind when using political 
ecology as a research or analytical tool. Brown et al. (2004) reminds us to not fall into the 
“local trap” that favors local communities uncritically. While I recognize that I have 
placed a good deal of emphasis on the importance of empowering local communities in 
MBCA (and the failure of those in power to do so), I hope that I have not done so 
uncritically. Indeed, I have attempted to show that local practices of conservation are not 
always perfect (as seen in Pakenham’s 1947 study of Chwaka), but rather that recognition 
and integration of local practices and knowledge has not happened to a great enough 
extent in MBCA. Also in Chapter 2, Willems-Braun reminds westerners to be wary of 
their own notions of “nature,” as even those of environmentalists are often inherited from 
a colonial history in the form of “buried epistemologies.” I recognize that as a Westerner, 
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I am not able to fully divorce myself from such notions of what nature is or how it should 
be conserved. However, it is my hope that I have also incorporated a Zanzibari 
perspective, particularly with the discussion in Chapter 5 of Zanzibaris' vast knowledge 
of coastal ecosystems. At the very least, I hope I have paid due consideration to the long-
standing resource management practices used by Zanzibaris, ones that existed long before 
interactions with western powers interested in their own notions of conservation. 
 Chapter 2 also laid out some ideas on how one might “do” political ecology. In 
revisiting these ideas, we see that the thesis has at least begun to use these approaches to 
look at Menai Bay. First, Bryant (1997: 11) puts forth that political ecologists should be 
addressing three questions. They are: (1) what are the various ways and forms in which 
one actor seeks to exert control over the environment of other actors? (2) how do power 
relations manifest themselves in terms of the physical environment? And, (3) why are 
weaker actors able to resist their more powerful counterparts? Answers to these questions 
(summarized in table 8.1) have been seen throughout the preceding chapters of the thesis. 
In chapter 3 we saw obvious ways in which colonial forces exerted control over the 
environment of local communities on the mainland, through outright exclusion and 
forced removal of villagers. In the post-colonial era in Chwaka, Tobisson et al. (1998) 
provide more subtle examples of this control being exerted by government powers, 
through the creation of policies that eroded the power held by local elders to enforce 
traditional conservation measures. The same case can be used to answer question 2, as 
these changing power dynamics resulted in resource management practices that led to a 
substantial reduction of prawns and other marine species, harming both local 
environments and the livelihoods of villagers. Finally, in response to question 3, we can 
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again look to the work of Myers (2002) on how the political divide in Chwaka has led to 
a reduction in local cooperation with conservation projects. As discussed above, this lack 
of cooperation can in some ways be seen as an act of resistance directed at those in 
power. Thus, this study of MBCA and the surrounding region has begun to answer the 
questions put forth by Bryant; a deeper dissertation-length study would be needed to 
answer them more fully.  
Table 8.1  
Question 1: What are the ways and forms 
in which one actor seeks to exert control 
over the environment of other actors? 
Answer 1: Creation of government 
policies that subsumed the power held by 
local elders to enforce traditional 
conservation measures 
Question 2: How do power relations 
manifest themselves in terms of the 
physical environment? 
Answer 2 Increased government control 
over resources resulted in a reduction of 
prawns and other marine species, harming 
both local environments and the livelihoods 
of villagers.  
Question 3: why are weaker actors able to 
resist their more powerful counterparts? 
Answer 3: Resistance through lack of 
cooperation  
  
 Second, we also saw some of the core concepts put forth by Blaikie and 
Brookfield (1987) in Chapter 2, which continue to inform political ecology work today. 
These are “a cross-scale chain of explanation, a commitment to exploring marginalized 
communities, and the perspective of a broadly defined political economy” (Robbins 2004: 
72, author’s emphasis). This thesis certainly uses a cross-scale chain of explanation; it 
addresses the roles of local communities, national governments, international NGOs, and 
bi-lateral aid organizations. It also looks at how actors at different scales have extended 
power and influence over time in Zanzibar. Additionally, the thesis has had an obvious 
(but not uncritical) focus on marginalized communities, with its emphasis on local 
villages involved in top-down conservation projects. The thesis has addressed the 
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political economy of the situation less explicitly, although the importance of it is implied 
throughout. This is particularly true with the Marine and Coastal Environmental 
Management Project (MACEMP), as it is both a conservation- and development- driven 
initiative and comes attached to a large sum of funding that many people in Zanzibar and 
Menai Bay are trying to access and utilize. Thus, while the thesis doesn’t make explicit 
mention of the political economy aspect of the research, it is inherent to the situation. 
More in depth research would provide a better and more nuanced understanding of how 
the political economy of Zanzibar impacts conservation projects there. 
 Finally in Chapter 2, we saw a chart from Blaikie (1995) organizing the primary 
stakeholders in a Zambian conservation area, including their positions and sources of 
power. In light of the political, cultural, and historical context of MBCA that has been 
provided in the preceding chapters, we can now use the concept of the chart to organize 
the stakeholders of Menai Bay (see Figure 8.1). This chart makes clear who has the 
power and who doesn’t in MBCA. While the sources of power for the local communities 
are the Village Conservation Committees— who have been deemed ineffective in the 
region— the sources of power for the government, WWF, and World Bank include the 
international community and the potential to inform or create regional and national 
policies. Those are clearly not equal forms of power. Likewise, the means to reach each 
group’s aims are also quite different for the stakeholders. Whereas the government, 
WWF, and World Bank can do so through access to financial resources and policy 
creation, the local communities are left again to working with VCCs or to acting illegally. 
With this in mind, it is interesting to note that the three groups in positions of greater 
power list community empowerment among their goals in MBCA, and yet the chart  
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Figure 8.1 Interest Groups in Menai Bay Conservation Areas 
Group 
 
Position in 
political 
economy 
Source of power Interests and 
aims 
Means to reach 
aims 
Local 
Communities 
Marginalized, 
empowered in 
theory but not in 
reality 
Village 
Conservation 
Committees, 
small acts of 
resistance 
Subsistence, 
revenue, access 
to resources 
traditionally 
belonging to 
them 
Illegal fishing 
and mangrove 
harvesting, 
working with 
Village 
Conservation 
Committees 
(only minimally 
effective) 
Government 
of Zanzibar 
Control and 
create policy, 
intermediary 
between aid 
organizations and 
local 
communities, 
access to capital 
Inherently 
powerful, 
creators of 
policy, 
implementers of 
conservation and 
development 
projects, allocate 
money 
Control of 
resources, access 
to resource 
revenue, 
conservation, 
“community 
empowerment” 
Creation of 
policy, garnering 
of international 
support and 
funding 
World 
Wildlife 
Fund (until 
2005)  
Collaborators 
with government, 
scientists, and 
others is positions 
of power 
Government 
connections, 
international 
community, 
financial 
resources 
Conservation, 
“community 
empowerment” 
Informing policy 
making, 
scientific 
research, 
publications, 
garnering more 
donor money 
World Bank 
(after 2005) 
Collaborators 
with government, 
control over 
government due 
to financial 
resources 
Government 
connections, 
international 
community, 
financial 
resources 
Conservation, 
“community 
empowerment 
(stated interests” 
Creation of new 
large-scale 
conservation and 
resource 
management 
project, 
MACEMP, 
informing policy 
making, 
scientific 
research, 
publications 
(Concept based on Blaikie 1995: 208) 
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shows that the local communities have no legitimate source of power. Thus for the time 
being, community empowerment is left as a goal in quotations only, as its importance is 
recognized, but it has yet to become a reality.  
 These three approaches to “doing” political ecology begin to present some of the 
potential methodologies and approaches one can use to conduct such research. As 
evidenced in the preceding paragraphs, these approaches are not only appropriate for the 
land- based ecosystems they were originally developed for, they are also useful for their 
coastal counterparts. While more in-depth analysis and research is needed to fully create 
a political ecology of Menai Bay Conservation Area, it is my hope that this thesis has 
taken the first steps in doing so. The next section of this chapter will briefly summarize 
what I see as the current state of MBCA, as seen through a political ecology lens. 
B. The current state of Menai Bay Conservation Area 
Given the above discussion, in addition to that found in Chapters 3-7, we can begin to 
draw some conclusions on the current state of Menai Bay Conservation Area, as seen 
from a political ecology viewpoint. Chapter 3 situated coastal conservation in MBCA 
within the broader setting of conservation in Africa. The discussion in chapter 4 anchored 
the thesis in a more global perspective of coastal conservation.. Chapter 5 provided a 
brief history of Zanzibar, as well as that of long-standing human-environment 
relationships on the islands. Chapter 6 provided the history of MBCA, as well as a 
discussion of the dominant conservation project there, the Marine and Coastal 
Environmental Management Project (MACEMP). Finally, Chapter 7 presented the 
findings of my fieldwork, both of interviews conducted in Zanzibar and the gray 
literature obtained there. Through an in-depth analysis of my findings, it was determined 
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that community empowerment, while recognized as important, had yet to be realized in 
any substantial form in MBCA. 
 Collectively, these chapters begin to paint a picture of the political ecology of 
Menai Bay Conservation Area. MBCA is enshrouded in a rhetoric of community 
empowerment that provides hope it will be different than conservation as usual; yet, a 
variety of issues have prevented this from happening. These issues include: Zanzibar’s 
long and complex history and resulting power dynamics, difficulties inherent to ICZM 
and coastal management in general, the political tension found between and amongst 
stakeholders, and ineffective forms of community empowerment. While this research 
only skimmed the surface of such issues, I argue that we can at this point determine that 
goals of ICZM have yet to be met in MBCA, particularly those of community 
empowerment. This finding is strikingly similar to the discussion in Chapter 3 on 
environmental efforts during the “new” era of conservation on mainland Tanzania, which 
spoke to the importance of community participation, but failed to actualize these goals. It 
seems that coastal conservation efforts are repeating the mistakes of their land-based 
counterparts in Africa. The following section will discuss the ways in which political 
ecology research could continue along the trajectory begun in this thesis to better 
understand how to create effective community-based policy in Menai Bay Conservation 
Area, as well as for coastal ecosystems more generally. 
C. The potential for future research 
While time did not allow for me to expand my study to the depth necessary to take a 
complete look at the political ecology of MBCA, it did provide some ideas on how to do 
so in the future. In addition to expanding upon the ideas of Bryant, Blaikie, and 
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Brookfield discussed in the first section of this chapter, I would also draw heavily from 
the work of Bassett et al. (2003). In their edited volume African Savannas: Global 
Narratives & Local Knowledge of Environmental Change (2003) they lay out a clear 
methodology for doing political ecology-based research in Africa, on which I would base 
any future research conducted in Zanzibar. They argue that the types of conservation that 
have occurred on the continent up until this point “allowed no place for ‘local,’ 
‘practical’ knowledge, devaluating the latter in favor of findings of ‘science’” (Bassett et. 
al 2003: 13). They insist on the importance of including subtler and more nuanced forms 
of local knowledge than the “master narratives” of the west generally allow for (Bassett 
et al. 2003: 18). They argue that following their methodology will lead to a better 
understanding of how to effectively manage Africa’s environments. While this work is 
again focused on land-based ecosystems, I argue that each point can easily be translated 
to work in coastal systems as well.  
 Bassett et al. argue for a hybrid methodology that combines both natural and 
social science. They say, “The challenge to all environmental research in Africa is to 
demonstrate the interaction of multi-scale biophysical and social practices in the 
explanation of environmental change” (Bassett et al. 2003: 23). The first step in their 
hybrid methodology is “measuring landscape change” (Bassett et al. 2003: 21). This is 
important, they argue, because current environmental policy is often developed without a 
firm understanding of what the current state of the environment truly is. A failure to 
understand and distinguish between environmental changes over multiple time scales can 
lead to misunderstandings and failed policy development (ibid.). They suggest using 
scientific studies of geomorphology, as well as aerial photography, vegetation transects, 
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and remote sensing in order to do this work. While these specific methods will not work 
in coastal settings for obvious reasons, the concept can still be transferred. Baseline 
studies of the health of coral reefs, fish species, mangroves, and the like can similarly 
lead to a better understanding of the state of the environment. These can be compared 
with the few historical “scientific” records of such things that do exist for the region, as 
well as with anecdotal accounts from villagers. Furthermore, if researchers begin to keep 
accurate records now, it will help inform better policy decisions in the future.  
 The second part of Bassett et al.’s methodology is “recovering the past.” They 
show that in order to do so, data must be collected from a variety of actors. They argue 
for the use of interviews with key informants, oral and written histories, semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation, surveys, and other techniques. They also urge 
researchers to collect the views of a variety of actors, including government officials, aid 
and donor organizations, NGOs, and the like. They argue that samples of local 
communities should include a diversity of gender, age, location, occupation, ethnicity, 
and economic status (Bassett et al. 2003: 24). No tweaking is necessary to utilize these 
techniques in a coastal setting; indeed, one could argue that they are simply urging for the 
use of good qualitative methodology to understand the long histories of research sites. It 
is my hope that I have begun to do this in this thesis, but further work is certainly 
necessary. 
 Finally, Bassett et al. argue for the use of “discourse analysis” in studying 
Africa’s environmental issues. They argue that it is important to conduct “discourse 
analysis of environmental and development texts” because they provide “insights in the 
origins of key ideas…” that currently inform environmental policy (Bassett et al. 2003: 
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24). In doing discourse analysis, they argue, researchers can begin to deconstruct the 
often-inaccurate perceptions of African environments that are used to inform and create 
environmental policy. Bassett et al. argue that through measuring landscape change, 
recovering the past, and doing discourse analysis of contemporary environmental and 
development literature, political ecologist can create more accurate perceptions of 
environmental issues in Africa, opposed to the ones told through the often incorrect 
master narratives of the west. They argue that this new perception has the potential to 
create more effective conservation policies in Africa.  
 Bassett et al. argue that utilizing the methodologies laid out above will greatly 
improve environmental knowledge about African environments, which will be critically 
important to developing more effective policy. I would add that these ideas should not be 
limited to the land-based ecosystems most often discussed by Bassett et al. and other 
researchers of similar viewpoints, but that they can be easily expanded to include, and 
indeed must include, their coastal counterparts. I believe that combining the 
methodologies and themes of Bassett et al. with the concepts discussed in the first section 
of this chapter has the potential to foster the in-depth research necessary to apply political 
ecology not only to Menai Bay, but also to coastal ecosystems throughout Africa and the 
global south. In doing so, I believe critically important changes could be made to coastal 
policy that has up until this point fallen short of its full potential. Not least of all, political 
ecology has the potential to help Marine Protected Areas truly reach the goal of 
implementing placed-based solutions through community empowerment. 
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D. Political ecology and coastal conservation  
 Menai Bay Conservation Area provides one small case study of a coastal 
conservation project in post-colonial Africa. Yet, it is not an anomaly. It fits neatly into 
the larger global discussion of conservation projects— both coastal- and land-based— 
that have a rhetoric of community empowerment, but that fail to truly deviate from the 
more standard model of top-down driven conservation. As seen in Chapter 7, 
conservation efforts in MBCA fail to truly understand and account for the specific issues 
of Menai Bay. Rather, it attempts to force community empowerment processes into a 
mold that is congruent with the “master narratives” many large-scale NGOs and aid 
organizations subscribe to.  
 All of this is not to say that MBCA, or the MACEMP project in particular, is a 
complete failure. Nor is it to say that they are not well-intentioned projects that truly 
strive to empower community members living in the conservation area to improve their 
livelihoods in ways that simultaneously take pressure off of the fragile marine 
environment. I believe that at some level the Government of Zanzibar, the World 
Wildlife Fund, MACEMP, and other large-scale stakeholders involved in conservation in 
Menai Bay have the interests of communities in mind. And yet, I also believe that these 
goals are hampered by the buried epistemologies they each hold of what “nature” and 
“conservation” are supposed to look like; they cannot let go of these western notions in 
order to see and incorporate those methods of conservation and resource management 
that have historically been used in the region. Furthermore, one can argue that it may be 
too soon to decide if conservation in MBCA is successful. As Hulme et al. state: 
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Community conservation has not proved the panacea that many had hoped 
for and short-term technical analyses seeking to measure whether 
‘conservation’ and ‘development’ have both improved are likely to lead to 
negative conclusions and ‘disenchantment’ with the strategy. However, re-
inventing conservation in Africa— for that is the task in hand— was never 
going to be a quick job that could be easily accomplished. If a longer-term 
perspective is adopted then the evidence…points to the conclusion that 
community conservation has made a useful contribution to pushing 
forward knowledge about more effective institutional frameworks for 
conservation” (Hulme et al. 2003: 296). 
 
 I argue that taking a political ecology-based approach to research, coupled with a 
longer-term perspective, has the potential to create truly successful forms of conservation 
that are healthy for ecosystems and people alike, and that are driven and supported by the 
communities most affected by conservation initiatives. This will involve developing a 
true system of “co-management” that gives agency to all stakeholders. According to 
Berkes (2005), “Co-management is a partnership in the sharing of management power 
and responsibility between a group of resource users and the government” (Berkes 2005: 
23). Berkes goes on to say that in the case of marine resources there is a need for a multi-
level system of co-management because there is “likely to be several communities or 
regions of resource users and several levels or branches of the government” who are 
involved and affected by management decisions (ibid.). The task of creating such a 
system will not be an easy one. It will involve taking an in-depth look at the cultural, 
historical, environmental, and political settings of individual contexts, bridging the gap 
between natural and social science research, decolonizing buried epistemologies of nature 
and conservation, and finding ways for NGOs, aid agencies, national governments, and 
local communities to enter into a dialogue on creating co-management systems.  
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 Perhaps it is naïve to believe this will ever be possible; it certainly won’t be 
simple or happen in the near future. However, based on the research and analysis 
conducted for this thesis, I believe that combining research based in political ecology, the 
well intentioned but often misplaced motives of large-scale stakeholders, the core 
concepts of Integrated Coastal Zone Management, and the desires, ideas, and needs of 
local communities will help to create a truly new form of post-colonial conservation. To 
do so, a stronger dialogue is needed between researchers doing political ecology-based 
research, practioners implementing on-the-ground projects, and local communities; the 
perspectives of each of these three groups will benefit from each other’s understanding of 
the complex issues at hand. Finally, it is necessary for political ecologists who study 
environmental conservation and degradation to include coastal ecosystems in their 
research. As this thesis has tried to show, places like Menai Bay Conservation Area 
would benefit greatly from research based in a political ecology framework. I believe that 
doing so has the potential to create conservation projects that will benefit fragile marine 
ecosystems and the people who depend upon them for their livelihoods throughout 
coastal Africa.  
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Appendix 1: Methodology and Approach 
I began this project with three primary interests in mind: The theory of political ecology, 
the region of Zanzibar, and the topic of conservation and its effects on local communities 
living in and around protected areas. I began building a base of knowledge about such 
issues during the first year of my Master’s course work and was eager to form my 
interests into one cohesive research question. After developing the primary research 
question and relevant sub-questions discussed in the introduction, I developed a three-
part methodology for my qualitative study: a primary literature review, a gray literature 
review, and fieldwork in Zanzibar. 
A. Literature Review 
Primary Literature 
My literature review began with the onset of my Masters course work, when I started to 
read the relevant writing on Africa (and East Africa in particular), political ecology, and 
conservation for classes and for my independent research. In doing so, I began to identify 
the core texts and authors that would serve as the foundation for my thesis work. For 
instance, in my reading of Christine Walley’s book Rough Waters: Nature and 
Development in an East African Marine Park, I began to understand how the experiences 
of coastal Tanzania fit into the larger discussion of globalization, conservation in Africa, 
and the power dynamics between government, NGOs, and local communities (Walley 
2004). I also began to understand how these dynamic and often precarious relationships 
can change over time, directly affecting the success of conservation initiatives. Walley’s 
work led me to other literature surrounding this and related topics.  
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 Likewise, my course work introduced me to many authors whose work in 
mainland Africa provides a historical background of conservation on the continent, and 
the ways in which the history continues to inform modern-day practices. Roderick 
Neumann, Richard Schroeder, and Jan Bender Shetler, for instance, helped me to 
understand the dynamics of post-colonial conservation in mainland Africa, and led me to 
other literature on related topics. Finally, a series of political ecologists, including Garth 
Myers, Don Moore, and Chris Brown, helped me to better understand the theoretical 
literature of the field and to think about how to frame my research questions in a way that 
would best contextualize the issues of coastal conservation in Zanzibar in its specific 
social, political, and historical setting.  
 Throughout my first year as a Masters student, I read as much of this literature as 
I could in order to form my base of knowledge. Prior to embarking on my trip to 
Zanzibar, I focused on the literature most pertinent to the region and my particular 
fieldwork. Upon my return, the literature I chose to read became more and more specific 
to the research questions I undertake in the thesis. It is my hope that together these bodies 
of literature have formed a strong foundation to support my analysis and conclusions.  
 
Gray Literature 
While in Zanzibar, I procured numerous documents that can be considered “gray 
literature,” or literature that is not from a scholarly, peer-reviewed source. A majority of 
the gray literature I obtained is in the form of environmental reports on the Menai Bay 
Conservation Area and the Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project, as 
discussed in detail in chapters 6 and 7. Examples include the “Environmental and Social 
Assessment of the Marine and Coastal Management Project (MACEMP)”, the “Rapi
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Assessment of the Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA)”, and the “Process 
Framework for the Marine and Coastal Management Project (MACEMP).” I also 
obtained a couple of historical documents from in the libraries of the Western Indian 
Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA). Finally, I was able to access copies of 
student’s Independent Study Projects in the library of the School for International 
Training (SIT) because of my affiliation with the organization as an alumnus of its study 
abroad program.  
 I use the gray literature for two primary purposes in the thesis. One, a bulk of the 
information on the backgrounds and objections of MACEMP are from these documents, 
as there are almost no other sources of information on this topic. Two, I use them to show 
the rhetoric of the MACEMP conservation initiative, and then to compare that rhetoric to 
what is actually happening on-the-ground in Zanzibar. While much of the literature is 
biased toward the World Bank or Government of Zanzibar, as they largely commissioned 
it, it none-the-less helps me to make critical observations of the ways in which 
conservation initiatives are conceived of, implemented, and framed for local 
communities.  
B. Fieldwork and Interviews  
Pre-departure Preparation  
I conducted six weeks of interview-based fieldwork in Zanzibar during the summer of 
2009. Before leaving, my primary contact for my fieldwork was Makame Muhajir 
(known as Muhajir). Muhajir was the director of the Department of Surveys and Urban 
Development for the Government of Zanzibar for eight years. He is currently finishing 
his PhD in Geography at the University of Kansas. He was an essential contact for me, as 
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we were already friends and he is well connected to many Zanzibaris who are 
knowledgeable about my research questions. Muhajir and I had a couple of long meetings 
before I left, during which he gave me advice, names and phone numbers of potential 
contacts, and general background information that was relevant to my research. Perhaps 
most importantly, he put me in touch with his cousin, Shehah Juma, an employee of the 
Department of Environment. Shehah Juma would serve as my initial contact in Zanzibar, 
and Muhajir set up an email exchange between us before I left.  
 In addition to talking with Muhajir, I also spent quite a bit of time talking and 
preparing with my advisor, Garth Myers, as he has extensive knowledge of Zanzibar and 
what it is like to conduct research there. His advice was invaluable and he also 
established some contacts for me, most importantly with his research assistant and good 
friend Ali Hassan Ali (known as Ali). Finally, Garth helped me to gain approval for my 
research from the KU Human Subjects Committee. The help I received from Muhajir and 
Garth, in addition to the large amount of reading I had conducted in preparation for the 
trip, equipped me well to begin my work in Zanzibar.  
 
Zanzibar 
It was exciting to arrive back in Zanzibar, where I hadn’t been since my semester abroad 
there in the fall of 2002. I quickly settled into my comfortable apartment in the center of 
historic Stonetown. Almost instantly upon my arrival, I received a phone call from Ali 
and we met in the gardens located around the corner from where I was staying. It quickly 
became clear that he intended to help me with my research as much as he was able, which 
was a welcome and unexpected surprise. Additionally, he became a quick friend and 
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confidant, and it was nice to have someone to help me navigate the complicated 
Zanzibari streets and culture. 
 I allowed myself a couple of days to settle in before beginning the interview 
process. The first person I met with was Muhajir’s cousin Shehah Juma. Our first meeting 
was very informal, we met to introduce ourselves to one another and to discuss my 
research project and whom I should get in touch with for my first interviews. We also 
talked about when I could meet his (and Muhajir’s) family; this was clearly important to 
him. In the end, I ended up spending quite a bit of time with their family, including taking 
a trip with them to their home island of Tumbatu. While this did not directly influence 
my research, it added an important layer to my understanding of Zanzibari life.  
 After my initial meeting with Shehah Juma, my actual interviewing commenced. 
All interviews were semi-structured; I would generally prepare 6-10 questions in 
advance, but would let the interview take whatever course made sense in relation to 
whom I was interviewing. I interviewed my initial contacts from Shehah Juma first, and 
then used the snowball method to find other interviewees. I also interviewed a couple of 
people I knew from my previous experience as a study abroad student in Zanzibar. By 
and large, most of my interviewees were employees of various government departments; 
this is due to the fact that my initial contacts (Muhajir and Shehah Juma) were well 
connected in that arena, and also because those people generally spoke very good 
English. It is also important to note that I was in a slightly precarious situation, as I did 
not have an official research permit from the Government of Zanzibar. This was due to 
the fact that they are extremely difficult to procure and take a long time to process. At the 
advice of my advisor, I decided it was best not to even attempt to get one. Thus, in order 
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to make sure I was not conducting illegal research I approached my work as 
“preliminary” for dissertation research I would return to conduct later. While I was not 
certain of this plan, it was a strong possibility and so I did not see any ethical issues with 
it.  
 In part because of this, I would begin my interviews by inquiring about what 
environmental issues the interviewee thought should be the focus of my longer 
dissertation research. This approach ended up being beneficial in two ways: 1) it allowed 
me to gain an overall impression of what people think are the main environmental issues 
on the island (which are many) and 2) it tended to make the interviewee feel more 
comfortable, as they could talk about their primary concerns and thoughts and not just 
answer my directed questions. After we discussed their ideas, I would express interest in 
MACEMP as a research project and ask them their opinion. This either led to interesting 
and informative discussions about the Project, or they would brush off the comment 
because they either didn’t find it important or didn’t want to discuss it.  
 I quickly fell into a daily routine. I would wake early and go to Swahili class for 
the first four hours of my day. After class I would eat a quick lunch and Ali and I would 
meet to discuss our plan for the afternoon. On days we did not have an interview 
scheduled, we would either spend the time making phone calls or tracking down people 
in person to set up times to talk. If we had an interview scheduled we would go to the 
person’s office (or occasionally a pre-determined restaurant or home). Ali would 
generally introduce me in Swahili and then I would make as much small talk in Swahili 
as possible. I found that even my feeble attempts to speak the language made people feel 
more comfortable and open to my questions. Then the interview would commence in 
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English. During the interview, I would take quick notes on the conversation, being 
careful to write down direct quotes that I knew I might want to use later. Ali generally 
didn’t intervene in the actual interview, unless there was a need for something to be 
translated. In total, I interviewed 17 individuals, some of whom I interviewed two or 
three times. 
 After the interview, Ali and I would walk to get kahawa (coffee) and discuss the 
interview. He often had important insights on the person and/or conservation that I would 
not have been able to discern on my own. Ali would then walk me home and I would 
commence to typing up my field notes from the day’s interview. I would first write down 
the conversation as accurately as possible; I would then write down my impressions and 
thoughts on the interview, as well as notes on follow-up questions for the person (I found 
that it sometimes took two or three interviews to get people to really open up about their 
thoughts and opinions). I also had a few “informal” interviews with people I befriended 
who wanted to give me their opinions or thoughts on coastal conservation in Zanzibar.  
 
Post-Zanzibar 
I returned from Zanzibar just in time for the start of the fall semester at KU. I set aside 
the interviews and gray literature I had acquired for a couple of months and focused on 
my course work. It was beneficial to take time away from the research I did there, as I 
was able to approach it with fresh eyes and perspective a couple of months later. During 
the first semester I continued my literature review, and found that I had a new perspective 
from my time in Zanzibar. As I began to write the thesis, the literature served as the 
foundation, but I found that I was able to use the interview results to add anecdotal and 
tangible support. In addition, I found that the gray literature I acquired provided a wealth 
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of information on Menai Bay Conservation Area and MACEMP that I would not have 
been able to find in the US. My fieldwork provided me with a more realistic and broader 
understanding of both the social and environmental setting of Zanzibar. It is my hope that 
in using this methodology I have been able to infuse the scholarly literature with some of 
the realities and intricacies of life and conservation in Zanzibar, and ultimately to draw 
accurate and insightful conclusions.  
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